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(iii)
"The policy and intention of the Act
has been the s ubj ect of considerable
public debates. With criticisms of
that policy the courts are not concerned
that their duty is to give effet to
the provisions of the Act. At the
same time, however, they must, insofar
as they are able to do so within the
limits prescribed by the Legislature,
impose punishment on persons convicted
of contraventions under the Act which
are just."
per Marais et al; J J in Nkosi and Others 1972 2 SA 753 at 755B:
"At all events, I do not think that
we should go on complacently -talking
about an independent judiciary in
South Africa when we are really speaking
only about one section of it. I do
not overlook the fact that shortcomings
on the magisterial bench are subject
to correction 1?';:}" the Supreme Court.
But, for vari9~§ reasons, inclz.x1ing
the poverty aid ~ ignorance of many
accused person~~........,_ t1}e majority of
magistrates' ceurts decisions are
not effectively subject to appeal
or review. "
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In this thesis I intend to show the extent to which sentences imposed
by magistrates in South Africa, for the crimes referred to in the
topic reveal the influence of government policy. The discussion will
include sentences which were considered by the Supreme Court on review
or on appeal in reported judgments and some statistics relating to
samples of sentences imposed for the relevant crimes in the Lower
Umfolozi (Empangeni) District Magistrate's Court during a stated part
of 1984. The law will be stated as at 31 December 1984.
In the Republic of South Africa about 90 per cent of all criminal
proceedings are conducted in the magistrates' courts. 1) Accordingly,
about 90 per cent of sentences are imposed by magistrates. In this
discussion magistrates include regional magistrates. Courts of district
magistrates and those of regional magistrates are classified as lower
courts. 2 )
1 The Second Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the
Structure and Functioning of the Courts in the Republic of South
Africa (which came to be called the "Hoexter Commission")
RP 35/1981 1. The Commission was appointed by the State President
on 29 November 1979.
2 Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944. as amended, section 1 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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The maximum ordinary punitive jurisdiction of a regional magistrate's
court is ten years or a fine of R20 000 and that of a magistrate's
court is twelve months' imprisonment or a fine of R2 000.
3
) A statute
may empower the court to impose punishment exceeding those I have
ref erred to . A magistrate may commit a convicted accused person to
a regional court f or sentence if the accused, in the opinion of the
d . hm bd' , , d' , 4)court, eserves punlS ent eyon ltS JurlS lctlon.
One of the most difficult tasks facing a presiding judicial officer
in criminal proceedings is deciding whether to impose a custodial
sentence or a non-cuctodial one or to suspend the operation of the
sentence in cases which allow the judicial officer a discretion. Van
Rooyen and Joubert refer to this decision as the "primar~7 decision".5)
The authors state: "Once thi s primary decision is taken the secondary
decision is us ually egsier, i. e. to decide upon the exact term of
imprisonment or to which non-custodial form of punishment to impose". 6)
The authors correctly point out that "In these often extremely difficult
decisions, which may have far-reaching implications not only for the
accused, but also for the victim, the accused's family, the victim's
family, the reputation of the court and of the law, the criminal justice
system (especially the prisons department) and the society at large,
the key principle is that the courts are entrusted wi th a sentencing
discretion. A discretionary power generally invol ves a cho~ce amongst
various options permitted by law, which choice must be exercised according
to legal requirements and with due regard to all the relevant facts.
A discretionary power therefore excl udes both the power to act
arbi trarily, and the existence of hard and fast rules which dictate
the decision of the court." 7)
3 Magistrates' Courts' Act - section 92(1)
4 sections 114 and 116 of the Criminal Pr.ocedure Act
5 van Rooyen,J Hand Joubert, J J 'Sentencing and Punishment' contained
in Bosman F 'Social Welfare Law' 1982 115
6 Ibid
7 at 115-116. See 3 of this chapter
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2. THE INDEPENDENCE OF MAGISTRATES
Magistrates are civil servants employed by the Department of Justice
and governed by regulations of the Public Service Commission.
8
)
Magistrates, therefore, do not enjoy the independence of judges of
the Supreme Court. 9) Judges are appointed by the State President
acting on the advice of the Executive Council. 10) Magistrates are
appointed mainly from the ranks of public prosecutors. 11)
The Hoexter Commission reports as follows:
"The image of criminal justice
in our lower courts is impaired
by the observance of administrative
arrangements incompatible with
the standards of judicial aloofness
expected of magistrates. It
often happens I for example I
that the magistrate and the
public prosecutor share the
same motor car and are seen
to arrive together at the seat
of the court where the trial
is about to take place." 12)
It is sometimes said that magistrates, in administering justice, 'must
8 Public Service Act 54 of 1957 - sections 3, 6 and 26 Ferreira,
J C 'StrafprDsesreg in die laer howe' 2 ed 1979 17
9 Gordon, G "Judges and Justice" (1981) January - 'South AFrican
Outlook' 11 see infra
10 Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 - section 10
11 Hoexter Commission - Second Interim Report 2
12 Fifth and Final Report, Part A at 27
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heed departmental policy". 13) Mr Justice Milne feels that "It is
absolutely fundamental to judicial impartiality that there should be
j udicial indep~ndence".14)
"The foundation of our legal system, as of all civilised legal systems,
is the existence of an independent judiciary. The part of our jUdiciary
., ,15) v . d d hmost in the publ~c eye ~s the Supreme Court.' ~entrl ge state t at
all magistrates were public servants who were under the discipline
of the Department of Justice and that this meant that not only their
promotions but also their postings from one part of the country to
another were in the hands of the Department of Justice. He also stated
that nearly all magistrates were former public prosecutors who had
been promoted to the magisterial bench and whose whole legal experience
and background had been the prosecution of offences on behalf of the
State.
He said that from the public point of view, the connection between
the judicial branch and the prosecuting branch of the Department of
Justice seemed too close. He continued to say that their position
as public servants made magistrates vulnerable to governmental pressures.
It is suspected that, in considering the appointment or promotion
of a magistrate, not only the interests of justice but also the promotion
of government policy is considered. Judge President Milne had this to say:
13 Didcott, J M 'The Didcott Memorandum and other submissions to the
Hoexter Commission' (1980) 97 SALJ 651 at 661
14 'Speech by the Honourable Mr Justice A J Milne to the Natal Law
Socie~y' (1980) 97 ?ALJ 453 at 456
15 Kentridge, S 'Telling th,9 truth about Law' (1982) 99 SALJ 648 at
650
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"Moreover, while no doubt some
magistrates can and do resist
it, there is insidious pressure
built into the promotion system
to please those who promote
one to higher stat us and salary
" 16)
The Hoexter COTIullission 17\ among others, observed the following factors
which affect the independence of magistrates:
(i) the fact that district magistrates as well as regional magistrates
were civil servants appointed in terms of the Public Service
Act and were functionaries of the Executive, makes their
independence suspect;
(ii) magistrates, as public servants, are transferred without their
consent. It is possible that a magistrate "might be exposed to
manipulation through such transfer" and thereby the i."llagC.' of
independent and efficient administration of justice is dented;
(iii)for promotion and salary increases magistrates depend on merit
assessment which is based on the reports by heads of their
departments, regional merit committees and a central merit committee;
(iv) a. magi~strate may be subjected to a departmental inquiry for alleged
inefficiency or misconduct. If he is found to be inefficient
or guilty of misconduct he may be discharged from the service
or his salary may be reduced.
16 at 458
17 Fifth and Final report, Part A 74
6
Kentridge 18 ) refers to a departmental circular which had been in
existence for many years. He says that the circular urged magistrates
to be cautious and restrained in making adverse comments in their
judgments about police witnesses. He believes that the circular had
been accepted by magistrates, apparently without protest. He states
that such a directive would never have been tolerated by the Supreme
Court Bench and that no public servant would dare send such a circular
to judges of the Supreme Court.
If this allegation is true magistrates would comply with the policy.
Failure to comply would probably jeopardise chances of promotion and
would render the magistrate vulnerable to transfer to another district
or to confinement to administrative work.
According to Mr Justice Didcott:
" even when they occ upy
the magisterial bench, civil
servants are not truly independent,
but must heed departmental
policy ... ".19)
Fear of prejudicing promotion




20 Kahn, E 'Appointment of Magistrates as Judges' (1971) 88 SALJ 512 at
516
7
Judge J P G Eksteen states:
"The magistrates are
in the civil service
as the administrative
to carry out Government





The judge stated that, on the other hand, judges are drawn from the
ranks of the Bar,
"Where they have been brought
up and n urt ured in a long tradi tion
of fear less independence in
no way subject to the pressure
of powerful litigants or influenced
in the least degree by the
importance of their adversaries".22)
While the judge admires his father who was a magistrate and who
always sought to uphold
the highest ideals of the civil
service and of the magistracy",
he feels that:
"If, however, the Government
were to appoint civil servants
to the Supreme Court Bench
they must realise that their
action can only serve to tarnish
and diminish this brightest
gem in the crown of our judicial
system." 23)
21 'From the address by the Honourable Mr Justice J P G Eksteen to the




Reacting to the criticism of the suggestion that magistrates should
be considered for appointment as judges of our Supreme Court,
Mr J N Oberholzer, the Secretary for
J . 24) said that the crux of theustlce
argument was that a civil servant did not possess the qualities to
become a judge because the civil service background and training would
prevent him from displaying fearless independence. He did not subscribe
to the view that a person I s courage is allegedly so adversely affected
in the civil service that he can never again act fearlessly although
he "has been freed from the Government yoke. He stated that quite
a number of former civil servants had in the past been appointed as
judges and he challenged Mr Justice Eksteen to prove "any manifestation
of constraint or partiality on their part". Mr Oberholzer said that their
magistrates were proud of a tradition of independence and impartiality
which stretched over many years. He said that he had at his disposal
glowing testimonials about magistrates wpich had been given by judges
and other jurists who were highly thought of in legal circles.
Dr L C Steyn's appointment to the Transvaal bench from the civil service
25)and his subsequent promotion to the chief justiceship was unpopular.
Cameron writes: "But his record as a judge has vindicated him, it
seems to be thought, and has shamed his critics".26) Beinart says:
24 ' Press stctement by the Secretary for Justice, Mr J N Oberholzer,
of 25-6 August' (1971) 88 SALJ 522
25 Cameron E, 'Legal Chauvinism, Executive-mindedness and Justice -
L C Steyn's impact on South African Law' (1982) 99 SALJ 38 at 39.
See also Beinart, B 'Aan sy edele doktor L C Steyn - voorsitter van
die Vereniging Hugo De Groot I (1973) 36 THRHR337 at 338
26 at 39
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"The favourite criticism which was used then was that he had not
participated in the hurly-burly of legal practice, a phrase I have
never fully understood in its relevance to jUdicial ,aptitudes. There
may be much hurly in practice but not so much burly, and I have yet
to be persuaded that every member of the bar has brought distinction
to the bench when appointed. The true test is surely the legal knowledge
and expertise of the appointee, his intellectual capacity and his
experience in the affairs of men, his general learning and culture,
humanity, integrity and impartiality. Practice at the bar is certainly
an excellent, but not necessarily the only, way of acquiring these
attributes and virtues. ,,27) The author said that he hoped that Dr
Steyn I S example would serve to make possible the recruitment in small
numbers to the judiciary of some persons other than those of the bar,
in particular from the universities, "To give some academic leavening,
provided, of course, such persons have the qualities and experience
. 28)
I have described".
There is so much weight against the appointment of civil servants
to the bench that such appointment should not be supported.
Mr Justice Eksteen emphasized that, because our judges had been brought
up in a tradition of fearless independence, the outlook of our judiciary
had been shaped and had been made what it was. 29 ) The judge said that, as
a result of the tradition of fearless independence our judiciary was






that even the most stringent critics of this country readily conceded
that however much they might dislike this country and its policies
our judiciary stood beyond reproach and commanded their respect.
30
) The
judge continued to say: "Speaking as a member of this judiciary I
would not take any real credi t for this esteem as being solely that
of the members of the judiciary. It is real y the esteem in which
our whole legal profession is held. Without the great traditions
of our Bar and our Side-bar, the Bench, which is merely the product
of the legal profession, could not possibly have any esteem of its
own. It is beca use our judges are drawn from the profession wi th
its great traditions of independence that they are what they are.,,31)
On the other hand, the judge said, such tradition was not in the civil
service and that it would be a very bad civil service if it had.
The civil service had other high traditions which were indispensable
to our way of life in a democratic country. Such traditions included
those of loyalty to whatever Government might be in power irrespective
of political views of civil servants, traditions of responsibility
towards the Government whose policy they must carry out and responsibility
towards the citizen in respect of whom they carried out that policy.
No magistrate shall perform the functions of a judicial officer in
any magistrate's court unless he has taken an oath or made an affirmation







do hereby swear/solemnly and
sincerely affirm and declare
that whenever I may be called
upon ID perform the functions
of a judicial officer in any
magistrate's court, I ,will
administer justice to all persons
alike without fear, favour
or prej udice and as the
circumstances of any particular
case may require, in accordance
wi th the law and customs of
the Republic of South Africa
or of the territory of South
West Africa."33j
Unt:Ll the contrary is proved, every judicial officer is presumed to
be bound by this oath in his administration of justice.
34
) From what has
been said it can be concluded that not all magistrates will be brave




in accordance wi th the law
and customs of South Africa
constitutes a contradiction
in terms that provides our
j1id~ge with his moral dilemma. "35)
Wacks deals with judges of the Supreme Court. He asks the question
whether or not a judge should apply the law he finds morally indefensible.
33 Magistrates' Courts' Act - section 9(2)(a)
34 Radebe 1973 1 SA 796 (AD) at 813 F
35 Wacks, R "Judges and Injust'ices" (1984) 101 SALJ 266 at 268.
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He states that by taking the oath a judge provides himself with a
moral dilemma. The same may be said of a magistrate. The meaning
of "cus1:oms" apparently includes procedures. Should the oath bind
a magistrate to follow instructions relating to court procedure, issued
by his department? From what has been said it is possible that his
position in the public service would be jeopardized if he refused
to carry out the instruction.
In the Holy Bible we read that, before He was crucified, Jesus Christ
was accused of many crimes by the chief priests. His case was tried
by Pilate, the Roman governor. Although Pilate was convinced that
Christ was innocent he eventually convicted Him and sentenced Him
to death because he was "afraid of a riot and anxious to please the
people" . 36) The juigment of Pilate indicates that an adjudicator
who l~cks fearless independence can consciously cause a miscarriage
of justice. Until magistrates are freed from the chains of the civil
service, miscarriages of justice, including imposition of unduly severe
37)sentences, can be expected to occur.
Ashworth states that judges often have to determine the balance between
the individual and the State and that they should therefore be in
a position to administer justice without fear or favour. 38 ) This
statement applies with equal force to magistrates. Ashworth discusses
the relationship between the legislator, the judiciary and the executive
in matters of sentencing. He asks the first question: "Is legislative
36 'The Living Bible I
Luke 23 verses 1-24
British ed 1974: Mark 15 verses 1-15 and
37 see infra
38 Ashworth, A: 'Sentencing and Penal Policy' 1983 58
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curtailment of jUdicial sentencing discretion unconsti t utional?" Having
referred to works of Jennings,39) a constitutional lawyer, Ashworth's
answer to the question is that courts are subordinate to the legislature
and that they are therefore constitutionally bound to apply statutes
duly enacted by Parliament. 40 )
Jennings, in his discussion of the British courts and the constitution,
'states that one of the characteristics of the courts is their
b d·· hi· 1 41)su or lnatlon to t e egls ature. The powers of the courts can
always be diminished or reduced by legislation. The author states
that the courts have recognised the claim of Parliament to pass
legislation on any subject whatever and to make whatever provision
it thinks fit. The courts are therefore bound by legiSlation. 42 )
The position of courts in Britain is similar to that prevailing in
South Africa. Their sentencing discretion, especially in statutory
offences, is conferred or removed by the legislator. It will be shown
in Chapter III of this work that at some stage magistrates who had
to sentence accused persons convicted of dealing in dagga had very
limited sentenc~ng discretion as the legislature had prescribed minimum
sentences.
The second question asked by Ashworth is: "Are executive attempts
to influence the judiciary unconsti t utional?" He answers this question as






follows: "The courts should not be subject to criticism or influence
by members of the executive. It would surely be unconstitutional
for the Government to 'pack' the bench wi th sentencers of a particular
persuasion, or to attempt to exert influence over the sentence to
be passed in a particular case, and Home Secretaries have traditionally
. . . 1 I 43)
decl~ned to comment on sentences ~n part~cu ar cases'. The pr0per role
of the executive is, according to Ashworth, "service the courts,
providing facilities and information and ensuring that (subject to
the exercise of executive review, through the parole system or the
prerogative of mercy) the sentence of the court is duly carried out." 44)
In' his discussion of British democracy, Jennings states that the first
clearly necessary institution is an honest and impartial administration
of justice. British judges take orders from nobody except Parliament
and superior courts. The author states that "although sometimes the
Judges have been appointed because of their pOlitical success, they
do their best to be impartial, and they would openly and forcibly
spurn any attempt at political pressure." 45)
It is interesting to note that in America' the appointment of judges
of the Supreme Court is influenced to a large extent by political
considerations. Tresolini and Shapiro state that "Party membership and
activity have always been of utmost importance in the selection of
43 at 63
44 Ibid
45 Jennings, W I: 'The British constitution' 4 ed 1962 at 199
justices.
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Rare indeed are instances when a President has appointed
a man to the Supreme Court who is not a member of his own poli tical
party".46) The authors state that, in making Supreme Court appointments,
the President is interested in placing men on the bench who "actively
share his views on the important social, poli tical and economic iss ues
47)of the day." One can only hope that such appointments do not
influence the independence and impartiality of judges, particularly
in cases where the government is interested and in those involving
parties opposed to views shared by the President 's political party.
As justice must be seen to be done, political appointments to the
bench should not be supported.
impure.
It is a practice which is juridically
The underlying consideration in judicial independence is the belief
that the judicial function demands impartiality.48) "Strict impartiality
is, of course, unattainable, for it involves not merely the absence
of control but the absence of prejudice. Judges do their best to
h · . . l' d' . 11 49)ac ~eve ~mpart~a ~ty, an ~n pr~vate matters they usua y succeed."
The author states that some legislation directed to social ends can
never be so precise as to leave no scope for differing interpretation
and that the rules of interpretation are not so definite that the
judge applying them can altogether exclude consideration of policy.
46 Tresolini, R J and Shapiro, M: 'American Constitutional Law' 3 ed
1971 44
47 at 45
48 Jennings (1959) 245
49 Ibid
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"Where, for instance, a statute gives a public authority power to
interfere with private rights, that power may sometimes be interpreted
either narrowly or widely "liberally", as it is sometimes put.
Jl.X1ges in fact differ on these matters, and it is sometimes possible
to forecast on which side a particular judge will be found. It is
... 1 ud ub., . ,,50) Th h t
qu~te ~mposs~ble to exc e s Ject~ve not~ons. e aut or seems 0
condone the bias which flows from "the ~nevitable unconscious prejudice".
Such bias differs from that which emanates from the dependence of
the judicial officer. 51)
3. POLICY, PRINCIPLE AND DISCRETION
These concepts are interrelated, as such they cannot be discussed
separately.
It has already been stated that the purpose of this thesis is to show
the extent to which government policy influences sentences imposed
by magistrates on accused persons convicted of the mentioned crimes.
Dworkin defines policy as " that kind of standard that sets out
a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic,
political or social feature of the community (though some goals are
negative, in that they stipulate that some present feature is to be
protected from adverse change)". 52)
50 Ibid
51 Ibid
52 Dworkin, R 'Taking rights seriously' 1977 22
17
Closely related to policy is principle. A principle is defined as "a
standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure
an economic, political, or social situation, but because it is a
. ... h d . . f 1 . ,,53)
requ~rement of ] ust~ce or fa~rness or some ot er ~mens~on 0 mora ~ty .
Ashworth distinguishes between penal policy and sentencing policy. "...
penal policy is for the government and sentencing policy is for the
courts. "
54) Ashworth defines penal policy as "that part of criminal
justice policy which determines the measures which should be available
55)
to the courts and the precise form they should take." The author
states that, in terms of penal policy, the legislature provides courts
with new statutory measures which they might use in sentencing offenders.
"By increasing the alternatives to immediate custodial sentences;
it has been hoped to exert some influence over the number of occasions
on which the courts resort to immediate custody". 56) "... attempts by the
executive arm of government to influence sentencing policy are
unconstitutional; attempts by the legislat ure to interfere wi th the
sentencing discretion of the courts are, even if not strictly
unconstitutional, bound to result in both practical confusion and
unj ustice to defendants; the development of sentencing policy should
therefore be left to the wisdom of the courts, under the guidance
of the Court of Appeal, and intervention by other bodies can only




56 at 112 See also Thomas, D A 'Principles of Sentencing' 2 ed 1979 3
57 Ashworth 59 See also Thomas 3
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The Legislature is the appropriate body to formulate policy, including
sentencing policy. The function of the court "is to apply to the
indi vid ual case the general rules laid down by parliament - A process
,. " 'r" 58) A h hwhich may conveniently be termed ~nd~v~duat~on . s wort states
that the process of individualisation is in practice· not merely a
question of rule-application. It often involves a great deal of
interpretation before a statutory provision can be applied in a
particular case. In this respect the role of the courts can be said
to be creative. But the creative role ought to be exercised "within, and
to the furtherance of, the policies implicit in the
, , r,59)
leg~slat~on.
In interpreting some of the selected statutory provisions some
magistrates were inf luenced by the policy of the executive. The result
was that they imposed inappropriate sentences.
In his discussion of the development and administration of penal policy
in England and Wales, Thomas states that the legislature "creates two
issentencerthe
distinct systems of sentencing, reflecting different penal objectives
and governed by different pr.incip.les. ,,60) Where
presented with a choice, he may, usually in the interests of general
deterrence, impose a sentence aimed at reflecting the, offender's
culpability or he may, in an endeavour to influence the future behaviour
of the offender, subject him to an appropriate measure of supervision,
t t . f' 61) Threa ment or preventlve con lnement. omas distinguishes between
what he refers to as "a tariff sentence" and "a sentence based on the






between the two, the sentencer must decide which objective should prevail
in - the particular case. In making this decision the sentencer must
apply the appropriate body of principle to determine the precise form
of- the sentence or measure he will adopt. There is a difference between
principles applicable to tariff sentences and those which govern the
selection of individualised measures .62 1:he author states that" the
detailed criteria which affect the final choice of sent~nce depend
on the primary decision, as do the significance of particular factors
in the case and the relevance of various items of information about
the circumstances of the offence or the backgrozmd of the offender.
It follows that a sentence which would be considered inappropriate
as an application of tariff principles may be considered entirely
correct if it is seen as an individ ualised measure based on the court's
assessment of the needs of the offender as an indi vid ual, and the
converse is equally true." 63)
Reference to the concept of denunciation may justify a tariff sentence.
According to Thomas, denunciation is "the theory that if the law fails
to impose a sentence of substantial severity for a particular class
of offence, the gravity with which it is, viewed by society will diminish
d
. . 64)an lncreaslng tolerance lead to more frequent occurrence. 11 An accused
person who has been convicted of an offence which constitutes a breach
of trust or an abuse of privilege usually attracts a tariff sentence,
although in the absence of this relationship the offence might not
be viewed in that serious light. 65 )
62 Ibid. See van Rooyen and Joubert 115-116
63 at 8-9
64 at 15
65 Thomas at 15. See also Hiemstra, V G 'Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses'
3 ed 1981 at 583
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The characteristics of the offender can identify cases in which the
primary decision is likely to be in favour of an individualised measure.
According to Thomas, four types of offenders, namely, young offenders
usually under 21 years of age, offenders in need of psychiatric treatment,
recidivists who appear to have reached a critical point in their life
and persistent recidivists who are in danger of becoming completely
institutionalised as a result of repeated sentences of imprisonment
are normally considered particularly suitable for individualised measures.
Unless an offence committed by an offender in one of these categories
is so serious that the case for a tariff sentence is overwhelming,
or his previous convictions to such measures indicate that such an
approach would be worthless, he will normally be dealt with by
° d" od 1° d 66) Th 1 f h ' OffIn lVl ua lse measures. e re evance 0 t e concepts 'tar~
sentence" and "individualised sentence" in this discussion will be
shown in cases discussed in chapters 11, III and IV.
From what has been said it is clear that, under normal circumstances,
a court with the duty of imposing punishment, has a discretion as
to the extent of the punishment to be imposed. That courts should
not have a discretion in imposing sentences is undesirable. Circumstances
in which offences are committed and the circumstances of accused persons
differ. The court should impose punishment which is appropriate to
the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the accused. "Punishment
must fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to society, and
be blended with a measure of mercy according to the circumstances". 67)
66 at 17-18. See also Rabie, M A and Strauss, S A: 'Punishment - an
introduction to Principles' 3 ed 1981 at 227, Hiemstra at 583
67 per Holmes J A in Kumalo 1973 3 SA 697(AD) at 698: See also Zinn
1969 2 SA 537 (AD) at 540G
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However, certain circumstances justify the imposition by a court of
a specific punishment. If, in a statute, the legislature denies courts
discretion in sentencing, courts must abide by the statutory provision.
Principles of sentencing are developed by our superior courts. A
superior court which gives a reasoned judgment on appeal or review
will draw up relevant principles. 68 )
Failure by a judicial officer to act in accordance with established
principles of sentencing constitutes a misdirection. " an error in the
as~essment or application of the factors relating to sentence constitutes
a misdirection if it invol ves a fail ure to act in accordance wi th
the established principles of sentencing or if the court is mista.ken
as to the existence or effect of a principle of sentencing". 69)
68 Ashworth 62 see, for example, Zinn and Kumalo cases and those
discussed in Chapters 11, III and IV.
69 Lund, J R 'Discretion, Principle and Precedent in Sentencing' Part 11
(1980) 4 SACC 36 at 44-.?
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CHAPTER II




When one reads the whole Act one gains the impression that the Legislature
aimed at preventing acts of indecency. It is further clear that
the Legislature intended that in certain circumstances contraventions
of the Act be punished with heavy penalties. The sections under
discussion do not contain provisions for minimum sentences.
2. SECTION 16 (Sexual offences between Whites and Coloureds)
2 . 1 Preliminary note
The Act
2
) defines"CoLour.ed person" as any person other than a White
person.
The contravention 'of the section is punishable with imprisonment
f or a period not exceeding seven years. Where necessary, facts of
cases, reasons for sentences and remarks of reviewing judges or judges





In the discussions at the third reading of the Bill, the Minister
of Justice, among others, said that the measure had been adopted
as early as 1927 to make it legally punishable "... if there was sexual
intercourse between Whi tes and Nati ves" . The Minister further said that
people who would come to South Africa from abroad had to be affected
by the Act and that they would be expected to behave like South Africans
so that South Africans would not be "a bastard race" and that they would
not "come into our ports and bastardize our people". 3)
In H and Another Marais, J said:
in the presen t Act the
prohibition covers not only
the sexual act but all or almost
all behaviour of a sexual nat ure
between White and Coloured
persons. ... The policy underlying
these prohibitions is common
knowledge, namely, to punish
all overt tendency towards
sexual intimacy between White
and Coloured, because it is
calculated to frustrate the
State policy of maintaining
the two races distinct" . 4)
2.3 Cases
In W en 'n Ander 5) The two accused had been convicted by a magistrate
3. Hansard, 14 February 1957 Columns -1141 and 1143.
4. 1959 1 SA 803 (TPD) at 804.
5. 1959 2 SA 179 (CPD).
of contravening the section.
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The first accused, a White man had
connnitted an innnoral act with the second accused, a Coloured woman.
The first accused had associated with non-Whites and had already
lived with the second accused as husband and wife for a period of
one year and eleven months. One child had been born of the relationship.
The second accused had two other children. The magistrate had sentenced
each of the accused to imprisonment for four months.
The two accused were, apparently, first offenders. On review, Van
Wyk, J said that the Immorality Act should be applied humanely and
that in the case of a person who was "technically a White" but had
already undergone a change of "colour" because of .his association with
non-Whites, a severe punishment should not be imposed. The judge
further said that each case must be dealt with on its own merits
and that no general rule could be laid down. The sentences were
altered to imprisonment for fourteen days with compulsory labour.
The judge correctly assessed the circumstances in which the offence
had been committed and allowed an appropriate sentence. The magistrate
could have suspended the operation of the whole or portion of the
sentences.
In .Q6), the appellant, a White male of 65 years of age and of poor
health had attempted to have carnal intercourse with a Coloured woman.
He had been charged jointly with the woman. The woman had also been
convicted. The magistrate had sentenced the appellant to imprisonment
6 . 1960 1 SA 15 1 (C P D) at 152.
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for four months with hard labour of which two months were conditionally
suspended for three years. The woman had been sentenced to imprisonment
for three months with compulsory labour of which two months were
conditionally suspended. On appeal the court said that the fact
that the appellant was a first offender of advanced age and poor
health had to be considered. Other considerations were that the
appellant had been living alone in his room and that the Coloured
woman had assis.ted him at times to clean, to prepare food and to
attend to his clothing and laundry.
Bloch, J further considered the fact that the appellant
"occupies a place very low
in the strata of European society
to punish him as if he
possessed the moral inhibitions
and the class and colour
consciousness of a better
privileged European, seems
to me to ignore entirely the
human and personal factors
which must always be taken
into account in assessing
punishment I cannot think
that sending this old man to
prison for a first offence
of this nature is required
ei ther by law or by society,
or that it will serve any purpose
whatever" .
The sentence was struck out and was altered to imprisonment for one
month with compulsory labour, the whole sentence conditionally suspended
for two years. The magistrate had ignored factors which were favourable
to the accused. Persons who contravene this offence are not otherwise
criminally inclined. In cases such as this, courts should show leniency.
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With respect, I disagree with Schreiner, J A who states in L:
"If the legislation imposes
so severe a strain on persons
not otherwise criminally. inclined
that a change in the law is
thought to be desirable, this
must be done by Parliament
itself. Courts cannot properly
give effect to any views that
they may hold as to the harshness
of the provisions in the face
of the manifest purpose of
Parliament that such offences
should be dealt with severely. "7)
When the Legislature provides in a statute harsh penalties, it does
not thereby do away with the discretion of the court, unless it provides
mandatory sentences. The penalty contained in section 16 does not
interfere with the discretion of the court. In suitable cases courts
may impose lenient sentences. In casu the accused, a White man aged
37 years, married with two children, had enticed, solicited or importuned
a Black female to have unlawful carnal intercourse with him. The
magistrate had sentenced him to three months' imprisonment.
unsuccessfully appealed to the Provincial Division.
He had
The accused had appealed further to the Appellate Division. In mitigation
of sentence, the appellant, a first offender, had said that he had,
on the night in question, drunk a "good deal of liquor" and that he was an
alcoholic.
Schreiner, J A was of the opinion that the sentence imposed by the
7. 1960 3 SA 503 CA) at 507.
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magistrate was not more severe than the general level of those imposed
for such offences. It is an established principle of our law that
there should be individualisation of sentence.
8
) Emphasis should not,
therefore, be laid on uniformity of sentences.
himself as follows on this aspect:
Botha, J A expresses
"Though uniformity of sentences,
that is of sentences imposed
upon acc used persons in respect
of the same offence, or in
respect of similar offences
or offences of a kindred nature,
may be desirable, the desire
to achieve such uniformity
cannot be allowed to interfere
with the free exercise of his
discretion by a judicial officer
in determining the appropriate
sentence in a particular case
in the light of the relevant
facts in that case and the
circumstances of the person
charged." 9)
Forst has this to say about uniformity and disparity of sentences:
"Acceptance of the individ ualised
sentencing model did not make
judges immune to criticism
for some variations in sentencing.
Even the strongest supporters
of individualised justice condemned
sentencing inequali ties that
derived from bias against race,
religion and social class,
nationality and similar factors
not related to the aims of
the rehabilitative philosophy.
Supporters of individ ualised
sentencing, however, viewed
most sentencing variations
as legitimate, justified by
individual differences in offenders
that were related to rational
correctional goals". 10)
8. Rabie and Straus Scheepers 1977 2 SA 154 CAD)
9. Reddy 1975 3 SA 757 CA D) at 759. See also Ferreira 684·Rabie and
and Strauss 228-230
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In Maseko and Others,ll) Davidson, J said that uniformity was a dangerous
and undesirable character to imprint on sentences in which the reasonable
discretion of the judicial officer should be exercised. He further
said that an automatic imposition of a type of sentence, without
exercising a discretion, may often result in unduly severe sentences.
In this case the accused was a first offender who had, as alleged,
taken liquor, and was married with two children. He had merely enticed,
solicited or importuned a Black female. Justice would have been
done if the appellant had been sentenced to imprisonment for one
month,the whole sentence conditionally suspended.
In ~,12) a Black woman had been sentenced by a magistrate to imprisonment
for 120 days. Her partner, a White male had been tried separately
on the same char~e' and had, on conviction been sentenced to imprisonment
for 180 days which, owing to his poor health and advanced age, had
been conditionally suspended for three years. The attention of the
reviewing judge had .beenl 9-rawn by the Attorney-general to a directive
from the Minister of Justice which was contained in Circular number
6 of 1959 to the following effect:
"Sy Edele die Minister van
Justisie het ook aanged ui dat
alle gevalle waar n blanke
en n nie-blanke weens n beweerde
geslagsdaad deur hulle gesamentlik
gepleeg onder Ontugwet, 1957,
skuldig bevind word wat tot
gevolg het dat een veroordeelde
gevangenisstrafmoet ondergaan
te:rwyl die ander weens die
feit dat sy/haar vonnis opgeskort
word of om n ander rede nie
gevangenisstraf moet ondergaan
nie, ook na hom verwys moet
word. "
11. 1972 3 SA 348 (TPD) at 351.
12. 1965 3 SA 17 (E)
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The reviewing judge confirmed the sentences, but in respect of the
Black woman he ordered that she was to be released on bail on her
own recognisances until 31st May 1965. The reviewing judge, however,
emphasized the principle that where the sentence imposed in a magistrate's
court is in itself proper and just, the mere fact that there is a
disparity between such sentence and that of another person charged
with the same crime does not entitle the court automatically to interfere.
As sentences should be individualised 13 ) the view of the reviewing judge
is in accordance with justice.
The statement of the Minister of Justice in the discussions of the
third reading of the Bill 14 ) that foreigners would not "come into our
ports and bastardize our people" was confirmed by the magistrate
. E 15)In . In this case the accused, a foreign (Greek) seaman had
been sentenced by the magistrate to f our months' imprisonment. In
a written statement, in mitigation of sentence on behalf of the accused,
it was said that the accused was a native of Athens in Greece, "a
cosmopolitan city where no social stigma attaches to any Greek who
cohabits with a non-European" and that it was the accused's first visit
to South Africa "and he WdS therefore not familiar with the laws
and customs prevailing in South Africa".
In his reasons for the sentence the magistrate had stated that if
a foreign seaman received a suspended sentence this would allow
13. supra.
14. supra.
15. 1966 2 SA 339 (NPD)
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"such seamen to contravene
the law without fear of being
dealt with severely ... suspended
sentences in such cases can
have no deterrent effect".
Caney, J found this to be a misdirection on the part of the magistrate.
The judge ordered that the whole sentence be conditionally suspended
for three years. The sentence imposed by· the magistrate was clearly
influenced by policy considerations. Such considerations had overshadowed
many mitigating factors, namely, absence of previous convictions,
lack of familiarity with the law (ignorance of the law), non-belief
in the policy of apartheid and that the accused might lose his employment
if he was imprisoned.
Another sentence in which the magistrate misdirected himself was
J.·mposed J.·n p. 16 ) Th d f 23 f hade accuse, a young man 0 years 0 age
had sexual relations with a Coloured woman. The magistrate had sentenced
him to imprisonment for six months of which three months had been
conditionally suspended.
conviction.
The accused had one unrelated previous
In mitigation of sentence the accused had stated that he had a wif e
and a child and that his wife was expecting a child.
had made the following remark:
but the penalty clause
of this statute is very severe
and suspension of a sentence
to be imposed entirely would
be making .light of serious
things" . 17 )





liThe :nagistrate, in my view,
clearly misdirected himself
in so far as he considered
that a suspension of the whole
of the sentence would be making
light of a serious matter.
In the first place the Legislature
has left unfettered the court's
discretion to suspend a sentence
of imprisonment imposed for
a contravention of section
16 of the Immorali ty Act. 11 18)
The judge further said that the Legislature had in mind that in
appropriate cases the courts should be free to suspend the whole
of a sentence passed on an accused. The judge stated that in the
case of first offenders, in recent years, the whole of the sentences
imposed were suspended.
The judge ordered that the whole of the sentence be conditionally
suspended for three years. The views of the judge are acceptable.
In 0 and Another 19), the two appellants, a White male and a Black
woman, respectively, had or had attempted to have unlawful carnal
intercourse. The magistrate had sentenced each of the accused to
imprisonment for six months with compulsory labour. In addition,
the first appellant (the White male) had been sentenced to a whipping
of four strokes. In his reasons for the sentence the magistrate
had stated that the first appellant had previously been acquitted
on a similar charge and that he had thus been forewarned. The magistrate
18. at 229.
19. 1959 4 SA 695 (NPD).
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had further stated:
"Accused did not just go in
for one act of immorality but
practically every night slept
in the huts with Native females,
kissed them etc . ... "
On appeal, Broome, J P said that it was without justification to
take into account a convicted person's previous acquittals for purposes
of sentence. The Judge President did not regard corporal punishment
as an appropriate punishment for this type of offence, unless there
were aggravating circumstances. He did not find such features in
this case and considered the sentence against the first appellant
unduly severe. The sentence was reduced by deleting the whipping.
Otherwise the appeals against sentences were dismissed. The record
does not indicate whether or not the two accused were first offenders.
From the magistrate I s reasons for the sentence it appears that the
first appellant had not previously committed the offence or a related
one. The fact that the first appellant had associated with Black
females per se did not justify a severe sentence.
this factor justified a lighter sentence.
20)In Wen n Ander
Accordingly, although
the whipping was deleted, the sentences remain unduly severe.
Imprisonment f or one month, conditionally suspended, would have been
an appropriate sentence.
Five strokes were deleted in A and Another. 21 ) In this case the first
accused was a Coloured woman.
20. supra.
21 . 1959 3 SA 16 (CPD) .
The second accused was a 47 year-
..
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old White male. The two accused had attempted to commit innnorality.
The magistrate had sentenced each to five months' imprisonment,
conditionally suspended for two years. The second accused had, in
addition, been sentenced to a whipping of five strokes.
On review Eloch, J said that imposition of cuts for offences under
the Innnorality Act is not an appropriate sentence except where there
are aggravating circumstances. In this case there were no such
circumstances.
The judge said: "Taking his age and the fact that he is a first
offender into account, as well as the feature I have mentioned, namely,
that there were no aggravating circumstances, it seems to me that
it is the policy of our courts, clearly laid down in two cases I
have mentioned, and several others, that cuts ought not to be imposed."
In giving evidence in mitigation of sentence, the second accused
had asked the magistrate to sentence him to cuts. He had said: "As dit
die hof mag behaag, is dit my versoek dat lyfstraf eerder opgele
word as tronkstraf. Dit sal my en my huwelikslewe moontlik kan red."
The judge said that the accused was not, in this case, as in any
other case, the most fitting judge of what sentence ought to be imposed
on him. The judge said that, that was a matter for the judicial
officer to consider in the light of such guidance as decisions of
the Supreme Court afforded him.
The sentences were confirmed but it was ordered that the five strokes
be deleted.
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The magistrate seems to have properly exercised his judicial discretion
in E and Another. 22 ) The appellant, a White male had picked up in
his motor car the second accused, a Coloured woman who was a stranger
to him. The appellant had driven to a sheltered spot where the
two had made love with each other. The appellant was a German immigrant
who had been in South Africa for about a year at the time when the
offence was committed.
The appellant had been sentenced to four months' imprisonment
conditionally suspended for two years. The sentence appears to be
approriate. The second accused had been treated as a juvenile and
had been placed in the care of her father.
accused the sentence was confirmed.
On appeal by the first
Another German immigrant was involved in the case of 1.
23
) He was 30
years of age and had been in South Africa for six months. He had
no previous convictions. He had consumed ' a great deal of liquor". The
magistrate had sentenced him to six months imprisonment.
On appeal it was said that the magistrate should have had more regard
to the background of the appellant and other personal factors. The
appeal court ordered that the whole sentence be conditionally suspended
f or three year s . The sentence imposed by the magistrate who ignored
several mitigating factors, is disturbingly inappropriate. He seems
to have been conscious of the statement of the Minister of Justice
that foreigners would not "come into our ports and bastardize our people",
22. 1960 4 SA 445 (CPD)
21 1968 2 SA 268 (CPD)
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when he imposed the sentence.
Although the accused was of. advanced age in J
24
), he was sentenced by the
magistrate to six months' imprisonment on each of the two counts
of contravening the section. The accused had enticed, solicited
or importuned - the first complainant, an adult married Coloured woman
to commit immorality with him. He had inserted his hand under her
dress and touched her. He had held the second complainant, aged
13 years, by her ann, inviting her to have sexual intercourse with
him and offering to pay her 10s. The accused had two previous convictions
for indecency. He was 66 years old.
appealed to the Transvaal ProvincialThe accused
Division.
had unsuccessfully
He had appealed to the Appellate Division. Dismissing
the appeals, Schreiner, A C J said that, in the circumstances, it
could not be said that the sentences were excessive.
It cannot be said in this case that the sentences were affected by
policy considerations. There were aggravating factors, namely, two
related previous convictions and the fact that the second complainant
was a girl of 13 years of age. The advanced age of the appellant
was outweighed by the aggravating factors.
The sentences imposed on the accused in Hand Another 25 ) do not seem to
have been adversely affected by the policy of the government. The appellants
were two White males. They had corrnnitted or attempted to corrnnit irrnnoral or
indecent acts




with three Black women in the following circumstances. At 22h45
the two appellants had entered a building in Eloff Street in Johannesburg.
The first appellant had beckoned the three women to follow them.
The women had followed the appellants into the building. The watchman
on duty at the entrance to the building had asked the appellants
why they were taking the women into the building at that time. The
first appellant had said that the women were going to clean their
office.
The caretaker to whom the watchman had reported had unlocked the
door of the office of the first appellant with his own key and had
found two of the women naked and the third one almost naked. The
magistrate had sentenced each to six months' imprisonment with compulsory
labour, of which three months were conditionally suspended. On appeal
it was argued on behalf of the appellants that the sentences were
unreasonably severe. Dismissing the appeal, Marais, J said that
the magistrate was correct in his reason for the sentences that,
had the caretaker not intervened, intercourse would have taken place.
The judge further said that the case was not one of sudden temptation
brought about by circumstances beyond the control of the appellants
but that "it was a deliberate flouting of the law and they cannot
be heard to complain at being sent to prison". The judge was of the
opinion that the undressing of the women had been either instigated
or permitted to take place by the appellants and that the women must
have been solicited by the appellants elsewhere.
The record does not show whether or not the appellants had previous
convictions. Even if they were first offenders, the circumstances
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in which the offence was committed justified the sentences imposed
by the magistrate.
Magistrates seem to have realised as from the late sixties that imposition
of policy - orientated sentences was a futile exercise, as most of
such sentences had been interfered with on appel or review. As a
result the number of sentences that were altered on review decreased
considerably. 26)
2.4 Conclusion
According to the Minister of Law and Order 27) during the period 1978 to
1982, 1233 people were charged with contravening the section in South
Africa. The feeling is today that the section and the Prohibition




An attempt to obtain statistics of cases of contravening this section
in some magistrates I courts was unsuccessful. Nowadays, as the figure
given earlier suggests, very few people are charged with contravening
this offence. Most of the few charges that are laid, are withdrawn.
Seemingly, the reason is not that few people commit the offence nowadays
but is, apparently, that the future of the policy has become doubtful.
26. see, for example. V 1968 4 SA 262 (NPD) ~ 1970 3 SA 346 (NPD) and R
1971 3 SA 787 (C P-D)
27. Hansard, June 22, 1983 Column 1640
28. see views of Roman Catholic bishops in their memorandum to the
Government I s Commission inquiring into these laws (r'Natal Mercury"
December 20, 1983) and Bekker, J C - "Ral van die regsprekende gesag
in n pl urale samelewing" Verslag Pol-21 HSRC. Pretoria 1983 at 21.
38
Some magistrates went all out to impose sentences which they believed
would do the country good "so that South Africans would not be a
bastard race". 29) The magistrates ought to have considered that
in contravening this section "... there is no question of an offensi ve
exhibition or nuisance, no question of harm to the yOl.IDg or those
in need of special protection and no threat to public order". 30)
Some of the cases which have been discussed show that in over-emphasing
Government policy, magistrates did not consider the provisions of
the then section 352 31 ) (now section 297)32) which provided/provides for
suspension of a sentence.
application of the section.
as was said in P that:
The Immorality Act does not prohibit the
It is theref ore a misdirection to hold,
..
that the penalty clause
of this statute is very severe
and suspension of a sentence
to be imposed entirely would
be making light of serious
things." 33)
It is trusted that the Government's Commission presently considering
the Immorality Act and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act will
recommend that this section which has caused serious criticism and
29. see the speech of the Minister of Justice (supra)
30. Burchell, E M, Milton, J R Land Burchell, J M - "South African
Criminal Law and Procedure" Volume 1 2 ed 1983 6. See also Hart,
H L A - "Law, Liberty and Morality" 1963 59.
31. of the repealed Criminal Procedure Act, 56 of 1955.
32. of the present Criminal Procedure Act (supra).
33.- P case (supra) at 229
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embarrassment to magistrates and the Government, be repealed. Burchell,
Milton and Burchell ask this question:
"Is the law entitled to punish
immorality merely because it
is immorality, i.e. without
pointing to any harmful
conseq uences?" 34)
The fact that contravening the section does not constitute a criminal
act in the true sense ought to serve as a mitigating factor, especially
because such an act is, as far as is known, punishable only in this
country.
Were it not for the intervention of reviewing judges and judges of
appeal some convicted persons would have served unreasonably severe
sentences imposed by magistrates who believed that they were promoting
government policy.
3. SECTION 14 (Sexual offences with girls under 16 years of age
and boys under 19 years of age)
3. 1 Introduction
Under this section two cases showing policy-orientated sentences
will be discussed.
Contravention of this section is punishable with imprisonment for
34. at 6
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a period not exceeding six years with or without a fine not exceeding
RI 000 in addition to such imprisonment.
3.2 Cases
In H35 ) the accused had contravened the section by having sexual
intercourse with a female person under the age of 16 years. The
accused was 18 years of age but had been between 16 and 17 years
of age at the time of commission of the offence. The magistrate
had sentenced him to imprisonment for two months with compulsory
labour.
The magistrate had ignored several mitiga~ing factors, including
the age of the accused, especially at the time of the commission
of the offence, that the accused had been maintaining the child born
of the sexual relationship, absence of previous convictions, and
that imprisonment could result in the child losing its maintenance.
On appeal it was held that the sentence was unreasonable. The appeal
court ordered that the imprisonment be conditionally suspended.
In this discussion of unlawful sexual intercourse with girls over
13 and under 16 years, Thomas states that the most important sentencing
consideration in case of ~nlawful sexual intercourse with girls between
13 and 16 is the age difference between the parties. 36 ) "Where the
offender is himself only a few years oLder than the girl concerned I
the usual sentence is a fine or conditional discharge, although an
35. 1959 3 SA 583 (CPD)
36. at 121
41
individualised measure such as probation will be considered appropriate
if the general circumstances indicate a need for training or
• • 11 37)
superv~s~on .
According to the author a prison sentence is likely to be upheld
where the appellant has deliberately flouted the law by committing
the offence with full knowledge of the circumstances and after appropriate
warning. 38) The cases discussed by the author reveal the following
useful guidelines:
(i) other aggravating circumstances, such as previous convictions,
may justify a sentence of imprisonment despite the absence
of a substantial difference in age.
(ii) offenders beyond their early twenties are more likely to receive
a sentence of imprisonment.
(iii) the law intends that girls under 16 should be prote'cted from
men and from themselves.
(iv) Although the age gap may be more than 10 years, a term of
imprisonment may be reduced where the accused had sexual relations
with a "willing" girl of 13 years who had previous sexual
experience.
Cv) "Sentences in excess of twelve months I imprisonment' are likely
to be upheld where, in addi tion to the difference -in ages
between the parties, the offence is aggravated by the existence
of a relationship between them casting some obligation of




(vi) Unusual depravity and indifference to the welfare of the girl
d ' t' factors.
39 )concerne constltute aggrava lng
The magistrate had in mind the "... policy of maintaining the two
races distinct,,40) when he sentenced the accused in S.41) In casu the
accused, a 47 year old White male and first offender, had, after
a misunderstanding, caused his wife to leave him. He had started
to indulge in liquor.
boy aged 15 years.
He had performed an indecent act with a Black
The magistrate had sentenced him to imprisonment
for six months of which four months were conditionally suspended.






fact that the appellant I
person consorted wi th
youth aggravates the
or indecent act he
with such youth". 42)
On appeal, Fannin, J said that in considering the punishment which
ought to be meted out to a male person for committing an indecent
or improper act with a boy under the age of 16 years, the race of
the victim of the offence is irrelevant. After he had considered
several mitigating factors the judge ordered that the whole sentence
be conditionally suspended.
39. at 122-123
40. in H and Another (supra) at 805




Although the section is a necessary measure to protect the young,
courts should consider all relevant factors when sentencing those
who contravene it.
4. SECTION 2 (Keeping a brothel)
4. 1 Introduction
A brothel is def ined as including any house or place kept or used
for purposes of prostitution or persons to visit for the purpose
of having unlawf~l carnal intercourse or for any other lewd or indecent
43)purpose.
Contravention of the section is punishable with imprisonment for
a period not exceeding three years with or without a fine not exceeding
six hundred rand in addition to such imprisonment, or where it is
proved that the person convicted kept a brothel and that unlawful
carnal intercourse took place in such brothel to his knowledge between
a White female and a Coloured male or between a Coloured female and
a White male, for a period not exceeding seven years with or without
a fine not exceeding Rl 000 in addition to such imprisonment.
The sentences imposed by regional magistrates in the cases discussed
hereunder clearly show that the offence is viewed in a serious light.
43. section 1 of the Act. (23 of 1957)
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4.2 Cases
44)In ! the appellant had kept a brothel. He had on more than one
occasion suggested to a woman that she have intercourse with a particular
man who would pay her. He had himself paid women on certain occasions
for having intercourse with him. He was apparently a first offender.
The regional magistrate had sentenced him to 12 months' imprisonment.
Dismissing the appeal, Williamson, J said that it could not be contended
that the sentence was unreasonable.
A first offender should, as far as it is possible, be kept out of
45)goal. "There is the h umani tarian argument that it is generally
more humane to leave an individual with his family and (where applicable)
.his employment than to remove him from society". 46)
A sentence of six months' imprisonment of which three months were
conditionally suspended would have been appropriate.
The sentence of 12 months' imprisonment of which six months were
conditionally suspended, was altered on appeal in E. 47 ) The appellant was
44. 1961 2 SA 381 (TPD)
45. Ashworth 429-430 Du Toit, E "Straf in Suid-Afrika" 1 ed 1981 57-9/
308 Hiemstra 578, 583 Harcourt, A B "Swift's Law of Criminal
Procedure" 2 ed 1969 at: 596 .!:! 1979 2 SA 25 (AD) Rabie and Strauss 237.
46. Ashworth 429 Du Toit 60-62
47. 1967 3 SA 500 (NPD)
unemployed as he was unable
received any income for the
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a White woman aged 27 years. She was
three young children. Her husband was
to obtain work. The appellant had not
a first offender. She had
prostitution of any other person except that of herself. She had
appealed against the severity of the sentence. Milne, J P said that
!"egard being had to the type of sentence generally imposed on persons
convicted of contravening the section, the sentence' imposed by the
regional magistrate was inappropriate. The sentence was altered
to one of four months' imprisonment conditionally suspended.
The case shows remarkable disparity between the sentence imposed
by the regional magistrate and the one allowed on appeal. The sentence
allowed on appeal is to be welcomed.
In H
48 ) the appellant, a first offender aged about 28 years had kept
a house or place for persons to visit for a "lewd or indecent purpose" in
that male clients had visited his massage salon for the purpose of
being given' ~;what was called .!J.pel vic massage!tby female assistants employed by
him. The regional magistrate in Johannesburg had sentenced him to
two years' imprisonment of which one year was conditionally suspended.
The appellant had unsuccessfully appealed to the Transvaal Provincial
Division. In his reasons for the sentence the regional magistrate
had,.among others, said that it was clear from the penalties provided
for in the Act that the Legislature had considered contravention
of the section in a very serious light.
48. 1977 2 SA 954 CA D)
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He said:
"The existence of this sordid
type of institution in our
commtmity is contrary to our
way of living. It can have
no place in our society. In
fact, should it be allowed
at all, it will affect the
very roots of our civilisation".
As regards sentence it was contended by the appellant's counsel that
the regional magistrate had misdirected himself in not approaching
the question of sentence with due regard to the fact that the form
of lewdness in this case was less serious than other forms of lewdness
contemplated in the section. It was further contended that the regional
magistrate had misdirected himself in taking the view that all forms
of lewdness are to be dealt with on a uniform basis for the purpose
of sentence. Lastly it was submitted that there should be a difference
in sentence where the proprietor of a massage salon merely permits
that form of lewdness, as was the case in this case.
Wessels, J A was of the opinion that a careful perusal of the regional
magis~raters judgement on sentence did not justify the criticism
implied in counsel's submission. He was further of the opinion that,
in all the circumstances of the case, it could not be said that it
was clearly inappropriate for the regional magistrate to have imposed
a form of sentence upon the appellant, a first offender, which denied
him the benefit of a wholly suspended sentence of impriBonment.
He did not consider the period of imprisonment excessively severe.
The appeal was dismissed.
47
It is -. a pity that the Appellate Division was not persuaded by sound
argument by the appellant's counsel. With respect, it is incorrect
that when the Legislature provides for heavy penalties, severe sentences
should be imposed in cases where strong mitigating factors are present.
If the Legislature intended that severe sentences should be imposed
on all accused convicted of contravening the section it would have
provided a minimum sentence.
offence would be committed in
The Legislature was aware that the
different circumstances by accused
persons of different personal factors, that is why it did not provide
for a minimum sentence. From the regional magistrate's reasons for
the sentence it appears that public policy was the .main consideration.
I share the view that the magistrate misdirect.ed himself, hence the
sentence which induces a sense of shock. Six months' imprisonment
of which three months were conditionally suspended would have been
an appropriate sentence.
The appellant in M 49) had kept a brothel between October 1974 and
June 1975. He was a first offender. The regional magistrate had
sentenced him· to pay a fine of R300 or, in default of payment, to
undergo 12 months' imprisonment. The appeal was against the conviction
.and was dismissed. The regional magistrate seems to have correctly
considered the principle of sentencing that, as far as possible,
first offenders should be kept out of goal. The appellant had kept
or used a house or place for lewd or indecent purposes. He had· held
shows at regular intervals at his house in which Coloured girls performed
various acts before an audience of White men. Some of the girls
49 1977 3 SA 379 (CPD)
undressed completely and danced.
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A£ ter the show, dancing had taken
place between the girls and the audience _and the appellant paid the _girls.
The record does not show whether or not the appellant was a first
offender. From the fact that compulsory imprisonment was not imposed
it is deduced that he had no previous convictions related to the
present one.
The circumstances in which the offence was committed justified the
sentence.
In p50 ) the appellant and two female accused had given pelvic massages
to men who came to the appellant's salon. Evidence had shown that
the appellant was the owner of two salons. He had no related previous
conviction. He was apparently an adult person. Cillie, J P said
that, although there was no indication that the regional magistrate
had misdirected himself he found that there was a discrepancy between
the sentence and the one he would have imposed and that he was therefore
entitled to interfere. He felt that, that was not a case where compulsory
imprisonment should have been imposed. The sentence was set aside
and was substituted for by one of a fine of R200 or, in default of
payment, to undergo six months' imprisonment, and a further six months'
imprisonment conditionally suspended for three years.
The view of the Judge President that not all contraventions of this
section justify compulsory imprisonment, is to be welcomed. After
all, principles of sentencing apply even to what are known as serious
50. 1975 4 SA 68 (TPD)
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offences. As stated earlier, one of the principles is that, as far
as is possible, first offenders should be kept out of gaol •.
4.3 Conclusion
The policy of the Department of Justice seems to be that keeping
a brothel is the most serious of the three offences under this Act.
Prosecuting authorities prefer to charge those alleged to have contravened
the section before regional courts, expecting the latter courts to
impose sentences beyond the jurisdiction of district courts. The
circumstances in which the offence was cormnitted and other relevant





THE ABUSE OF DEPENDENCE-PRODUCING SUBSTANCES AND REHABILITATION CENTRES
ACT, 41 OF 1971
1. INTRODUCTION
The ~bject of the legislature in enacting this Act was that there
should be extremely severe punishment available to our courts.
1
)
The Act was brought into operation on December 6, 1971 by Proclamation
in terms of section 65 of the Act.
From the cases which are discussed in this chapter it is obvious
that some magistrates experienced difficulty in interpreting certain
provisions of the Act, especially those relating to sentence.
Cases relating to contraventions of section 2(a) and 2 (b) relating
to dagga only, will be discussed.
Section 2 Ca) relates to dealing in a dependence - producing drug
or any plant from which such dependence-producing drug can be manufactured.
Section 2 Cb) relates to possession or use of any dependence-producing
drug or plant.
1 Shangase and Others 1972 2 SA 410 (NPD) at 414; Mamase and Others




2.1 section 2 Ca)
Originally the Act2) provided that for a contravention of this sub-
section punishment would, in the case of a first conviction, be
imprisonment for a period of not less than five years, but not exceeding
fifteen years.
In the case of a second or subsequent conviction imprisonment would
be f or a period not less than ten years but not exceeding 25 years.
Between December 6, 1971, when the Act came into operation and July
6, 1973, the date when the Act was amended as shown in the next paragraph,
a portion of a sentence could be suspended. The passing of a sentence
could not be postponed, nor could a convicted person be discharged
with a caution or reprimand. 3)
As from July 6, 19734) no portion of a sentence for a contravention
of the sub-section could be suspended.
In 1978,5) the Act was amended. The effect of the amendment was
that, in the case of a first conviction imprisonment would be for
a period not exceeding 25 years. In terms of the 1978 Act the provisions
of section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 apply to
accused persons convicted of dealing in dagga.
2 section 2
3 Kroutz case at 921
In other words,
4 in terms of the Abuse of dependence - Producing Substances and
Rehabilitation Centres Amendment Act, 80 of 1973, section 2
5 in terms of the Abuse of Dependence-Producing Substances and
Rehabilitation Centres Amendment Act, 76 of 1978.
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sentences imposed on such persons may now be suspended. Passing
of sentence may be postponed or a convicted person may be discharged
with a caution or reprimand.
The Commission of Inquiry into the Penal System of the Republic of
South Africa6) had recommended that the minimum sentences provided
for contraventions of section 2 of the Act be repealed to make it
possible for any court convicting an accused person for an offence,




) has this to say about mandatory sentences:
"While inevitable difficulties
can arise from differential
sentencing in discretionary cases
it is, I believe, generaily
better for the courts to have
a discretion rather than have
their hands tied by the" legislature.
After all, they are manned
by case-hardened professionals with
professional instincts, professional
standards and professional
discipline. The danger of
not having such discre' on
is highlighted by the so-called
,Dagga Act' 1971 "
2.2 Section 2 Cb)
Originally, a first offender8 ) would be sentenced to imprisonment for
6 known as the "Viljoen Commission" RP 78/197() 99 et seq.
7 Mr Justice R N Leon 'Opening- Remarks' published in 'Criminal Justice
in South Africa' edited by Olmesdahl, M C J and Steytler, N C 1983
at 1
8 means a person convicted for the first time of contravening the
sub-section
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a period not less than two years but not exceeding ten years.
In the case of a second or subsequent conviction imprisonment for a_~
period not less than five years but not exceeding 15 years was provided.
However the Act 9) provided from its inception that whenever a court
is bound to sentence a person convicted of being in possession of
dagga and the court is satisfied that there are circumstances which
justify the imposition of a lighter sentence than such prescribed
punishment, it shall enter those circumstances on the record of the
proceedings. On a first offender the court shall then impose a term
of imprisonment not exceeding two years. On a second or subsequent
conviction, the court shall impose a term of imprisonment not exceeding
five years.
7.
Much will be said later about the provisions of section
The 1978 Amendment Act 10 ) affected the sub-section. In the case
of a first conviction an accused would be sentenced to imprisonment
for a period not exceeding ten years. In the case of a second or
subsequent conviction he would be sentenced to imprisonment for a
period not exceeding 15 years.
The effect of the 1978 amendment is that there is no longer a minimum
sentence in respect of the two offences.
2.3 Penal jursidiction of magistrates courts





to impose any of the sentences referred to in 2.1 and 2.2 of this chapter.
3. POLICY
andWelfareSocialofMinister
Reading the Abuse of Dependence-Producing Substances and ,Rehabilitation




we have before the House
today a measure which, from
the very outset, has been described
by the popular Press as ' the
toughest anti-drug laws in
the Western world' and I do
not blame them for describing
it in those terms. The pend ul um
has apparently swung from the
one extreme to the other.
Be that as it may, we are truly
in earnest about stamping out
with might and main this diabolical
underminer and destroyer of
Western man and his morals
here in our country. the
committee found that in our
country the problem is to a
large extent still concealed
like an iceberg and should
be viewed in a serious light.
the committee found that
this problem was already costing
its evil shadow and that it
could follow the same diabolical
pattern as it did in other
countries if the necessary
meas ures were not taken in
good time. For thatreason
the Government has decided
to take strong action, and
for that reason this Bill makes
provision not only for minimum
penalties in respect of certain
offenders, but also imprisonment
wi thout the option of a fine,
up to a maximum of 25 years
in some cases.
12 Hansard, May 5, 1971. Columns 5950 and 5951
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We still believe in moral standards
and codes in this country,
and even if other countries
were to yield before this pressure,
before the fine-sounding name
of individual freedom, we are
still not prepared to raise
permissiveness to a virtue
in South Africa".
The Minister said that although some people believed that dagga was
harmless, there were prominent medical men who firmly believed that
it was habit-forming or dependence-producing and that it could lead
to serious personality disturbances and behaviour which very often
triggered violence.
The Minister I s speech has been quoted at length because cases which
are discussed hereunder show that some magistrates had considered
the statement in imposing sentences.
4. SOME OTHER VIEWS ON HOW DAGGA AFFECTS ITS USERS
The idea that severe sentences should be imposed on users or handlers
of dagga stem from the belief that this substance is dangerous.
Those who share in this belief are of the opinion that heavy sentences
should be imposed on those who violate the provisions of section
2.
13)Du Pre, Le Roux and Botha say:
13 (initials not given) of the Institute for Social Development,
University of Western Cape in their paper delivered at the South
African Conference on dagga held in Durban on 14-15 September




"However I to suspect that dagga
can be very hannful indeed
does not imply that one should
be in favour of heavy criminal
sanctions on the use of dagga.
Our evidence very clearly shows
that the chronic dagga smokers
were generally the victims
of their environment. It would
be wrong to punish them for
neglect of parental care and
for the inability of the educational
system to gi ve them the necessary
support where their parents
had failed."
These authors conclude with the words
"prevention rather than punishment
should be our motto".
Dr Teggin,14) a senior psychiatrist at the University of Cape Town,
Valkenberg and Groote Schuur hospitals is of the opinion that dagga
precipitates or exacerbates psychosis in vulnerable individuals and
that in these cases specific behavioural and psychopathological changes
are seen.
Some of the dangerous effects of dagga on its users are "Estimation of
distances become inaccurate. Attention span and the abili ty to remember
h · . . . . ,,15) A d h ht ~ngs that have Just happened ~s ~mpa~red. ccor ing to t is aut or
some of the effects can interfere dangerously with the ability to
drive or to operate other complicated machinery. About individuals
14 (initials not given) in his paper "Cannabis abuse by psychotic
patients" delivered at the South African Conference on dagga (supra)
(unpublished)
15 ~his is the view of Schankula (initials not given) in his paper
titled "Dagga: Facts and Fiction" delivered at the Durban Conference
(supra) at 8 (unpublished).
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who regularly use high doses of dagga over long periods the author
says that they stop contributing to their families and the community.
They seem to degenerate to a state where they no longer care about
themselves and their surroundings. However, the author states that
it was not clear whether such problems are the result of dagga use
or simply occurred at the same time.
Even if it could be said with certainty that dagga is very harmful
to human health, that fact, standing alone, would not justify severe
sentences. Except in cases where minimum sentences were provided
courts should still have exercised their discretion in assessing
sentences.
"There has been considerable
disagreement among experts
as to the effects of cannabis.
On the one side of the continuum
of opinion are those who regard
cannabis as a harmless and
imyotent_ substance, or who
see it in a positive light
as a mind-expanding drug.
Others regard it as a potentially
dangerous drug that distorts
and impairs perceptual and
mental functioning." 16)
5 . GUIDELINES EXTRACTED FROM LEADING CASES
5.1 The Shangase case
The following guidelines have been extracted from the judgment of
16 Volbrecht, WM 'Die Daggaprobleem: Psigologiese, Fisiologiese en
Maatskaplike Effekte' (Deel 1) (1977) 1 SACC 51
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Harcourt, J in the Shangase case. 17 ) The guidelines are relevant to the
discussion of the provisions of both section 2 (a) and 2 (b) and are
very useful to sentencers.
(i) Parliament regarded the abuse of dependence - producing
drugs as a considerable evil and th,at there should be extremely
severe (perhaps even harsh) punishments available to the
courts to be used in appropriate cases of grave contraventions
of the Act such as the machinations of large scale, especially
organised operators." 18)
(ii) By providing wide ranges of punishment between relevant
maxima and minima the Legislature intended to provide courts
with the discretion in regard to punishment. 19)
(iii) The wide range of punishment between relevant maxima and
minima calls for the formulation of just standards to determine
. . hm . h 20)an approprlate punls ent In eac case.
(iv) Courts have a discretion to suspend the operation of the
prescribed sentences. The judge said: "In this regard it must
17 supra See infra in this chapter
18 at 414H Kroutz case at 926H
19 at 415F Kroutz case 926H
20 Ibid
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also be borne in mind that the Legislat ure has not seen
fit to exclude the expedient available to courts of suspending
portion (and in some cases all) of the punishments under
the Act." 21) By "and in_some cases all" the judge apparently
meant cases where circumstances justifying the imposition
of a lighter sentence were present in a contravention of
section 2(b).
(v) Although it cannot be doubted that the Legislature intended
that the abuse of dependence-producing substances should
be treated very severely, the Legislature did not intend
that every offender should be treated very severely. Each
should b d· . 22)case e treate on lts merlts.
(vi) Courts must not be influenced by the harsh penal provisions
of the Act to impose harsh sentences especially in regard
to first offenders. "This would tend to defeat the well
accepted approach to punishment, namely, that it should
desirably be such as to fit the crime and also, and probably
equally importantly, the criminal in the surrounding
circumstances of each case." The judge referred to the
statement of Rumpff, J A in Zinn23 ), namely, "What has to be
considered is the triad- consisting of the crime, the offender
and the interests of society".24)
21 at 416G Kukarie en Andere 1972 2 SA 907(0) at 915 B-D
22 at 416. Cf Kroutz case 922-923
23 supra




The prohibitions of section 2 of the Act "refer to drugs which
are, prima facie, of widely differing harmfulness, for
example, heroin and prepared opi um on the one hand compared
wi th small plants of unprepared dagga on the other. If
the court is satisfied that such prima facie difference
significantly exists, then this would be a relevant fact
in regard to punishment." 25)
The court must regard and consider the cumulative effect
of such of the factors as may be relevant. The judge went
on to say that the factors "must also be considered
indi vid uall y to assess the quali tati ve cogency of each
in the particular facts of the indi vid ual case. Furthermore,
each of such variety of consideration must be effected
. .. f . d d . ,,26)
~n a sp~r~t 0 percept~ve un erstan ~ng.
(ix) Age is always a matter to be taken into account in view
of its potential effect on maturity, either because of
youth or senility or advanced age. In appropriate
circumstances age should be regarded as a "circumstance" in
terms of 27)sec. 7. The provisions of section 7 will be
(x)
discussed later.
The Absence of previous con\Tictions is a matter affecting
25 at 416 E-F
26 at 423 H
27 at 425 B-C
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sentence. "Thus there is, in my judgment, no doubt but
that the absence of any, or any directly relevant, previous
convictions or a long period wi thout convictions after
relevant previous convictions should be taken into account
in regard to the possible existence of "circumstnaces"
in terms of sec.7. It is of course equally true that the
presence of relevant previous convictions must be taken
into account by being put into the scales in weighing up
all the circumstances to decide whether or not a higher
sentence should be imposed. ,,28)
(xi) That the accused is responsible for his dependants, that
he has been in regular employment and that his employer
would be prepared to take him back if his term of imprisonment
is not too long, and that, if his wife and family and his
duty to them are likely to assist in his ref ormation, are
relevant considerations for sentence. "In my judgment such
factors are proper for consideration but will probably
be of significant weight only when regarded cumulatively
with other circumstances". 29)
,(xii) There is no general rule that before a court may wholly
or partially suspend a sentence the court must be satisfied
that special or exceptional circumstances exist. Such
a rule would interfere with the discretion which the presiding
28 at 424 B-C
29 at 427 H - 428 A Kukarie case at 916 G-H
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officer undoubtedly has in the matter of sentence. All
circumstances which may persuade the court to impose a
less severe sentence are relevant for consideration in
this regard. 30) The judge emphasized that there is also no
general rule that a first offender should always be extended
the advantage of a suspended sentence even in regard to
relatively non serious offences. 31 ) Such a rule would unduly
interfere with the court's discretion. The judge said
(xiii)
(xiv)
that "... what must always be weighed up is the benefit of the
accused and of society in deciding what is a fair (or equitable)
punishment ... ,,32)
The Act does not exclude other expedients of dealing with
, d' '1 33) Th d 11 be f dconvlcte Juvenl es. e expe ients wi re erre
to later under 6.1 of this chapter.
The second or subsequent conviction referred to in sections
2( ii ) and 2( i v) of the Ac t mus t be one under the provisions
of the relevant paragraph of section 2. The section does
not relate to previous dagga convictions under the repealed
Act 13 of 1928 or any other law even if such are included
in the generic description of offences under section 2
of the A 34)ct.
30 at 428 D-E. See also Joelson 1971 2 SA 135 (RAD) at 137
31 at 428 G.See also Victor 1970 1 SA 427 (AD)
32 at 428 G
33 at 429-30 See Kroutz case 924-926. Kukarie en Andere at 911-913
34 at 433 B-C Kroutz case 924G. Kukarie en Andere at 914
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(xv) Section 48 of the Act provides that where the age of the
d b · be· d 35) Mr J t .accused is in ou t lt must estlmate. us lce
Harcourt said: "Every effort should be made to obtain
the best available evidence I for example I that of parents I
guardians and relati ves of accused persons who might qualify
as juveniles and I in the unavoidable absence of such persons I
medical evidence should be sought. The court should also
note on the record all steps taken and evidence received
to establish the age of the accused and a formal finding
36)
should be recorded."
5 . 2 The Kroutz case
In the Kroutz en Andere case the Full Bench answered questions raised
by some provisions of the Act. The court said that most questions
had already been answered by courts in the following cases:
and Others37 ), Kukarie en Andere38 ) and Nkosi en Andere39~
Shangase
Van Wyk, J (Banks, J and Van Heerden, J concurred) gave judgment.
Some of the guidelin~s contained in the judgment relating to both
dealing in and possession of dagga are the following:
35 see also section 383 of the repealed Criminal Procedure Act 56 of
1955 (now section 337 of the criminal Procedure Act)




39 1972 2 SA 753 (TPD)
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(i) Only a portion of the sentence may be suspended where the
11 d · 1 h" 40)court is compe e to lmpose at east t e mlnlffium sentence.
(ii) Where circumstances justifying the imposition of a lighter
sentence are found in terms of section 7 of the Act, the
sentence which is imposed may be suspended, not in terms
of section 352(1)(a) bis but in terms of section 352(1)(b)
of the repealed Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955.
Section 352. (1) (a) bis related to postponement of the passing
of sentence for a period not exceeding three years and
the release of the convicted person. The court could order
that within that period the convicted person might be called
upon by any magistrate to appear before him.
Section 352(1)(b) related to the passing of sentence but
ordering the operation of the whole or any part of the
sentence to be conditionally suspended for a period not
exceeding three years.
( .
These provisions are contained in sections 297(1)(a) and
297(1)(b), respectively, of the Criminal Procedure Act.
Van Wyk, J said: "Ek kan d us angel ukkig nie saamstem met
die stelling in S v Shangase and Others ... dat die uitstel
40 at 921 C
(iii)
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van vonnis ingevo1ge die bepa1ings van art.352(1 )(a) bis
gemagtig is indien strafversagtende omstandighede ingevo1ge
art.7 gevind word nie. ,,41)
A contravention of section 2 in a prison must. be regarded
as an aggravating circumstance. Van Wyk, J said: "Een van die
redes waarom mense na die gevangenis gest uur word, is om
hullos te maak van hu1 misdadige gewoontes en gebruike,
en om hul1e n ge1eentheid te gee om by verstryking van
hul gevangenisstraf 11 nuwe begin te maak. Dit is wel bekend
dat ernstige aanrandings dikwe1s in die gevangenisse p1aasvind
as gevo1g van die gebruik van dagga. ,,42) A warning should be
sounded that sentencers should consider this factor with
other factors. Mitigating factors could be present even
h h . h b d" 43)were t e sectlon as een contravene In prlson.
(iv) Any circumstance relating to the accused, the offence or
the public interest can be considered circumstances justifying
the imposition of a lighter sentence in terms of section
7. 44)
(v) It is clear that the Legislature intended that our courts
should have unlimited discretion to impose any sentence
of imprisonment on accused persons convicted of being in
possession of dagga. 45 )
41 at 921-2
42 at 926 G Shangase case at 437 B
43 Shangase case at 437 A-C
44 at 926 D
45 at 926 H Shangase case at 415 F
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(vi) The heavy punishments laid down by the Act indicate the
serious light in which the Legislature views the contraventions.





As regards dealing in dagga the heavy punishments prescribed
must not be lightened by suspension to such a degree that
the intention of the Legislature is foiled.
47
)
A previous conviction under Act 13 of 1928 is not a previous
conviction for the purposes of section 2 of the Act under
d ' ,48)lSCUSSlon.
(ix) It is desirable that juveniles with _no previous convictions








The Act does not exclude other expedients of dealing with
, d' '1 50) Th dconvlcte Juvenl es. e expe ients will be referred
to later in this chapt~r.
at 926 H Shangase case at 414 H
at 927 A
at 924 G Shangase case at 433 B-C
at 924-926 Shangase case at 424
50 at 924-926. See Shangase case 429-430
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6. SENTENCES
6.1 Cases under section 2(a) (Dealing in dagga)
In Nkosi and Others the full bench was concerned about 26 review
matters relating to possession of, or dealing in dagga in contravention
of section 2 of the Act. Marais, J said:
"The policy and intention of
the Act has been the subject
of considerable public debates.
with criticisms of that policy
the courts are not concerned
that their duty is to give
effect to the provisions of
the Act. A t the same time,
however, they must, insofar
as they are able to do so within
the limits prescribed by the
Legislat ure, impose punishment
on persons convicted of
contraventions under the Act
which are just." 51)
The judges before whom 'the cases had first come on automatic review
had asked magistrates concerned to furnish their reasons for the
sentences. Some magistrates had referred to remarks made by the
Minister of Social Welfare during the debates on the provisions of
the Act in Parliament, in justification of the sentences they had
imposed. The Court remarked that it is not permissible for a court
in applying a statute, to have regard to statements made in the course
of debates in Parliament and that the meaning of the provisions,
and the intention of the legislature must be found from the terms
of the Act itself.
51 supra at 755
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Some magistrates, in their reasons for sentences, had stated that
to suspend a substantial portion of the sentence prescribed would
have the effect of defeating the intention of the legislature. In
the view of the reviewing judges the suggestion by the magistrates
was unf ounded as there was nothing in the Act to suggest that the
accepted principles relating to suspension of sentences should not
be applied in cases which arise under the Act. The court said that
within the limits prescribed by section 2 of the Act, judicial officers
have an unimpaired discretion in the fixing of a proper and just
punishment with due regard to all the relevant details and circumstances
connected with the crime and the person convicted.
The Court correctly said that such discretion is necessary because
there may be considerable differences in the seriousness of the offence.
52)In Shangase, the accused, a young man of 22 years of age had been
convicted by a magistrate in that he had cultivated 56 plants of
dagga. The accused had a previous conviction of possession of dagga
in 1971 f or which he had been fined R5 or in default of payment,
to undergo 14 days I imprisonment. He had, in the present case, been
sentenced to imprisonment for five years.
On review it was submitted that the sentence was glaringly inappropriate
in view of a relatively modest number of dagga plants. The Attorney-
general contended that there should have been a suspension of the
operation of 1/ a not ins ubstantial portion - of the imposed sentence 1/ •
52 supra at 436
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Bearing in mind the age of the accused, the quantity of dagga in
question and all the circumstances of the case, but bearing in mind
the previous conviction for dagga, the court considered it appropriate
and just to order that the operation of three years of the imposed
sentence .should be conditionally suspended for three years.
In Malebo en 'n Ander, 53) a Black female aged 25 years had been found
in possession of 27 2011s of dagga weighing 150 grarmnes. The other
accused had also been convicted of dealing in 15 20lls of dagga weighing
110 grammes.
Both accused had no previous convictions. They had admitted that
they had possessed the dagga for sale. Each accused had been sentenced
to imprisonment for five years in the magistrate's court.
From the reasons for sentence it appeared that the magistrate had
considered the provisions of section 7 of the Act which provides
for a lighter sentence if there are circumstances which justify it.
The magistrate had misdirected himself as this section applies only
when an accused has been convicted of contravening section 2(b) or
Cc) of the Act.
De Villiers, A JP, was of the opinion that the sentences were severe
and was further of the opinion that in terms of section 352 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 (now section 297 of the Criminal
·Procedure Act 51 of 1977) portions of the sentences could be suspended.
53 1972 2 SA 751 (OPD)
- ..
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The Acting Judge President found that there were no aggravating
circumstances in both cases. A police witness had testified at the
trial that a zoll of dagga would cost 10 cents.
the accused would derive would therefore be minimal.
The profit which
The court ordered that in each case three years of the five years
be conditionally suspended for three years.
In Mateus54 ) the appellant, a married man aged 53 years with ten
children had dealt in 2090 grammes of dagga. The magistrate had
imposed eight years' imprisonment. The appellant's vehicle in which
the dagga had' been conveyed had been declared forfeit to the State.
The appellant had- previous convictions of less serious offences.
The previous convictions were more than ten years. old. In terms
of section 303 ter (1) and the Fifth Schedule to the 1956 Criminal
Procedure Act the appellant had been treated as a first offender
because he had had a clean period of more than ten years.
reasons for sentence the magistrate had said:
"n Hewige afkeur bestaan teen
die gebruik van afhanklikheidsvormende
stowwe by die gemeenskap en
hierdie afsku vind uiting in
die buitengewoon swaar strawwe
wat deur die Wetgewer vir die
gebruik en verspreiding van
hierdie stowwe in hierdie
gemeenskap voorgeskryf is."




On appeal, although Badenhorst, J P was not of the opinion that the
magistrate had misdirected himself, he felt that there was a disparity
between the sentence imposed by the magistrate and the one he would
have imposed, and that, as such, the sentence should be interfered
with. The appeal against sentence succeeded but the one against
forfeiture of the vehicle failed. The sentence was altered to one
of five years' imprisonment of 'which two years were conditionally
suspended for five years.
The sentence imposed by the magistrate was unduly severe. The magistrate
seems to have considered principles applicable to tariff sentences
not those which govern the selection of individualised measures.
Individualised measures ought to have been applied to a married 53
year-old first offender with ten children and whose vehicle was to
declared forfeit to the State.
55)In Mofokeng the accused had dealt in 368,2 grammes of dagga.
A magistrate had sentenced the accused to imprisonment for five years
of which f our years had been conditionally suspended for three years.
~ ....... ."...~- --'
On appeal the sentence was confirmed. The magistrate . had exercised
his discretion judicially. There is no indication that the sentence
had been adversely affected by policy considerations.
In Harvey56) the accused had been sentenced to five years' imprisonment.
While he was 19 years old he had, together with another youth aged
55 1973 2 SA 89 (OPD)
56 1977 2 SA 185 (OPD)
('
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20 years, dealt in dagga. He had two previous convictions of being
in _possession of dagga in contravention of section 2 (b) of the Act.
On May 17, 1973 he had been sentenced to four months I imprisonment
which was conditionally suspended for three years. On April 2, 1975
he had been sentenced to five cuts with a light cane. He had another
previous conviction of malicious injury to property for which he
had been cautioned and discharged.
On appeal M T Steyn, J said that where an accused, at the time of
the commission of an offence, is under the age of 21 years, he can
be dealt with in terms of section 342 or 345 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 56 of 1955 (now sections 290 and 294, respectively, of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977). A juvenile accused could be dealt with
in terms of section 159 of Act 56 of 1955 (now section 254 of the
Criminal Procedure Act).
Section 290 r.elates to dealing with a convicted juvenile (ordering
that he be placed under the supervision of a probation officer or
that he be placed in custody of any suitable person or that he be
sent to reform school) and section 294 relates to sentencing a convicted
male juvenile to moderate correction of whipping. Section 254"
(section 159 of the repealed Criminal Procedure Act) provides that
if it appears to the court during the trial upon any charge of any
accused under the age of 18 years that he is a child in need of care ,
it may stop the proceedings and order that the accused be referred
to a children's court. If the order is made after conviction, the
verdict shall be of no force in relation to the juvenile and shall
be deemed not to have been returned. The judge stated therefore
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that the sentence in such a case is discretionary and that the personal
circumstances of such a convicted person-and the manner in which
he had committed the offence are highly relevant in determining an
appropriate sentence. The sentence was set aside. The court
substituted it by one of ten cuts with a cane. The magistrate's
main consideration in imposing sentence was that the offence was
a serious one and had thus failed to exercise his discretion properly.
Ten cuts with a light cane seems to be a severe sentence. There
is presently great conflict of opinion on the subject of corporal
punislunent. While some people believe that this form of punislunent
should be abolished because it "is brutal in its nature and constitutes a
severe assa ul t upon not only the person of the recepien t but upon
his dignity as a human being. ,,57)
Didcott, J said the following about whipping in terms of section
294 of the Criminal Procedure Act: "The punishment is familiar to
teenagers who have committed crimes of some seriousness involving
violence or dishonesty, or who have a .history ,of delinquency demanding
stern treatment after the indulgence shown them in the past. It
is then an al ternati ve to sending to a reform school or to goal,
and a more lenient one". 58) Mr Justice Didcott said that although
juvenile whipping is less severe than whipping meted out to an adult,
one should not underestimate either the physical pain or the psychological
trauma a police officer can inflict with a light cane. 59)
57 per Fannin, J in Kumalo and Others 1965 4 SA 565 (N) at 574 G-H. See
also Van S D'Oliveira, J A: "Corporal punishment as an alternative
to, or in Part-Commutation of, a sentence of imprisonment" published
in (1983) 18 'The Magistrate/Die Landdros' at 191 Tanbiga 1965 1
SA 257 (SR) at 258 E-G
58 in M 1982 (1) SA 240 eN) at 245
59 at 245 A
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Botha, J A expressed himself as follows.in connection with determining
an appropriate sentence to be imposed on a juvenile: "In the case of a
juvenile offender it is above all necessary for the Court to determine
what appropriate form of punishment in the peculiar circumstances
of the case would best serve the interests of society as well as
the interests of the juvenile.
The interests of society cannot be served by disregarding the interests
of the juvenile, for a mistaken form of punishment might easily result
in a person with a distorted or more distorted personality being
event ually ret urned to society. To enable a Court to determine the
most appropriate form of punishment in the case of a juvenile offender,
it has become the established practice in the Courts to call for
a report on the offender by a probation officer in, at least, all
serious cases "
60)
In the Harvey case the magistrate had called for a probation officer I s
report after conviction. According to the report the appellant had,
since leaving school at the age of 16 years, been employed at about
12 places and that during certain periods he had been unemployed.
He had admitted that he had started smoking dagga when he was 17
years of age but he had denied that he had been addicted to it.
The probation officer said that the attitude of the Director of
rehabilitation services was that "... persone met "kriminele rekords" nie
in rehabilitasiesentra opgeneem word nie".61) She was of the opinion that
in the circumstances of the appellant a sentence of imprisonment
60 Jansen and Another 1975 1 SA 425 AD at 427H-428A. See also Ruiter
en n Ander Beyers en Andere Louw en n Ander 1975 3 SA 526(C)
61 at 187 F-G
would be the most appropriate.
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She was, however, not willing to
say that the appellant was not a suitable case for treatment in such
an institution.
officer's findings.
The appellant had contested some of the probation
M T Steyn, J found the following mitigating factors present; namely,
youthfulness of the appellant and the fact that the appellant had
played a lesser role in the commission of the offence had not received
the magistrate's serious consideration. The judge said that the
four months' imprisonment which had been conditionally suspended
on May 17, 1973 could be put into operation. However, the judge
made and order in terms of section 352(1)(a) and (b) of the repealed
Criminal Procedure Act further suspending the operation of the sentence
for three years as from May 17, 1976 subject to two conditions, one
of which was that during the period of the further suspension the
appellant be subject to the supervision and control of a probation
officer as defined in section 1 of the Act under discussion. This
order seems to have been appropriate in the circumstances and was
likely to serve the interests of society as well as those of the
appellant.
The question is whether the appellant and society benefitted from
the sentence of ten cuts with a light cane, especially because the
sentence of five cuts with a light cane imposed the previous year
had not deterred the appellant from committing an offence involVing
dagga, nor had the suspended imprisonment for four months. In Tanbiga 62 )
62 supra
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the accused, a first offender, was also 19 years of age. He had
been convicted by a magistrate of grave indecent assault on a respectable
married woman of about 40 years of age and mother of two children.
The magistrate had sentenced the accused to six months' imprisonment
with hard labour and four cuts with a cane.
On review, Young, J said that the offence was a serious one as it
revealed a disgusting disregard for the feelings of the complainant,
The judge said that short-term imprisonment was sometimes necessary
but it should not be resorted to lightly as it exposed the offender
to contamination and little opportunity for constructive training.
The jduge went on to say: "To my mind the case is one in which a short
tenn of imprisonment should have been avoided.
the accused requires a short sharp lesson. ,,63) The
It is a case where
conviction was
confirmed but the sentence was set aside and was substituted by one
of four cuts with a cane. The judgment is to be welcomed.
In my opinion the "short sharp lesson" of ten cuts with a light cane in
the Harvey case following on the one of five cuts imposed the previous
year, was, with respect, severe.
and society benefitted from it.
It does not seem that the appellant
As the judge was of the opinion
that the appellant might benefit from being under the supervision
and control of a probation officer, he could as well have dealt with
the appellant in terms of section 342 of the repealed Criminal Procedure
Act (now section 290). "Prevention rather than punishment should be our
motto". 64)
63 at 258 H
64 footnote 13 of this chapter
the accused to imprisonment for five years
The case of Pledger 65 ) also
magistrate had sentenced
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illustrates a misdirection. A regional
for dealing in dagga. The accused had appealed to the Provincial
Division. He had turned 21 years of age between the time of the
commission of the offence and his conviction. On appeal the sentence
was set aside. In terms of the then section 345 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 56 of 1955
court substituted it by
of five cuts with a light
must look at the age of
(now section 294 of Act 51 of 1977), the
that of moderate correction of a whipping
cane. Cloete, A J P stated' that the court
the accused as at the date of commission
of the offence in exercising its discretion to sentence a person
not exceeding 21 years of age.
The case of Khulu 66) came before the Provincial Division as an automatic
review case. The accused, a young Black who was unrepresented had
been convicted by a magistrate of dealing in dagga. The accused
had one related previous conviction. The magistrate had sentenced
him to imprisonment for ten years.
The record reflects that after the accused had been convicted, before
he had been sentenced, he had been taken to a district surgeon for
assessment of his age. According to the report by the district surgeon
the accused was not less than 18 years of age.
The accused had contested the report by the district surgeon. The
latter had, in his evidence, adhered to his conclusion that the accused
was at least 18 years old. The accused had replied as follows:
65 1975 2 SA 244 (E)
66 1975 2 SA 518 (NPD)
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"My parents told me I am 1 6 years
old. If the doctor says I
am 18 I cannot dispute it further."
Without any further enquiry into the age of the accused, the magistrate
had sentenced him.
Kumleben, J (Shearer, J concurring)' confirmed the conviction but
set aside the sentence and referred the case back to the magistrate
to obtain a report by a probation officer and to make such further
enquiry into the age of the accused as may be reasonably practicable
and thereafter to sentence the accused afresh.
Even if it had been proved that the accused was 18 years old, the
to the court.availableimprisonment
magistrate would still have misdirected himself as regards sentence.
Th 1 · 67)ere were a ternatlves to
Sentencing an accused person of this age to imprisonment for ten
years, despite the available alternatives, shows a serious lack of
the sense of justice.
The order by the reviewing judges is welcomed. Legislative policy was,
obviously, misinterpreted by the magistrate.
In Setnoboko
68
) the accused, had been sentenced to imprisonment for
five years of which three years had been conditionally suspended
for five years. The accused was a 27 year old first offender. He
had dealt in 300 grams of dagga.
67 such as those provided for by the then sections 342 and 345 of the
then Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 mentioned earlier
68 1981 3 SA 553 (OPD)
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On review, the magistrate had been requested to furnish his reasons
for sentence. In his reasons for sentence the magistrate had stated:
omdat daar versagtende
omstandighede teenwoordig was,
het die hoof besluit om drie jaar
gevangenisstraf vir n tydperk
op te skort. n Verdere doel
wat die opskorting van n deel
van die vonnis betref, is om
n swaard oor die beskuldigde
se kop te hang om te probeer
verhoed dat hy weer dieslefde
misdaad in die toekoms pleeg".69)
When asked why he had decided to suspend three years for five years
the magistrate had replied as follows:
"waarin beskuldigde hom sal
kan bewys en die drie jaar
gevangenisstraf wat oor sy
kop hang moet· dan nie alleen
vir hom beskerm nie maar ook
die gemeenskap teen die gebruik
van die euwel wat beskuldigde
aan h ulle verskaf." 70)
Flemming, J said that in the determination of what is an appropriate
sentence in a particular case and whether a portion of the sentence
should be suspended, it would be wrong to look at part of the sentence
only as though the suspended portion does not have to be served.
The judge said that of the suspended portion it can only be said
that it does not necessarily have to be served, it remains part of




The need for careful consideration of a sentence, which, as a whole
is appropriate, cannot be relaxed merely because there is a possibility
that the suspended portion of the sentence will eventually not have
any real effect in that it will not have to be served.
The court reduced the sentence to one of 20 months' imprisonment,
of which eight months were conditionally suspended for three years.
(The Amendment Act 71 ) had got rid of the minimum period of impris0~ent.)
In Mateisi 72) the accused had dealt in 2,19 kilogrammes of dagga.
The accused was a first offender.
to imprisonment for four years.
The magistrate had sentenced him
On review the magistrate had been
requested to furnish his reasons f or the sentence. The magistrate,
in his reasons, had referred, among others, to a reported case where
Holmes, J A had said:
no doubt, too ... a supplier
for gain may in general be
regarded as a vicious person
who needs to be put down, for
in the drug traffic he is an
indispensable evil link in
the chain leading to the consumer. "73)
The magistrate had said that mitigating factors were that the accused
who was 34 years of age was a first offender. The accused was married
and had three children. He was employed and earned R3, 85 per day.
71 section 1 of the 1978 Amendment Act
72 1981 2 SA 368 COPD)
73 Gibson 1974 4 SA 478 (AD) at 481 H
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As aggravating factors the magistrate had considered "die groat
hoeveelheid dagga en die baie onskuldige mense wat daardeur benadeel
kan word". Viljoen A J, said that the amendment of sections 2 and
2 A of Act 41 of 1971 by Act 76 of 1978 reflected an important change
of principle by the legislature in respect of its attitude towards
dagga. The latter Act had abolished the minimum sentence.
The judge went on to say that, although imprisonment would be applicable
to a first offender where a large amount of dagga is involved, there
were cases where the interests of society and the interests of a
particular offender would be served just as well if p~rt of the sentence
is conditionally suspended.
The court accordingly altered the sentence to one of imprisonment
for four years of which two years were conditionally suspended for
three years. What a striking disparity!
In Batshise,74) the quantity of dagga was 11,98 kilograms. The appellant
had been sentenced to imprisonment for six years of which four years
were conditionally suspended for five years. His interests in a
1974 model Chevrolet motor vehicle had been declared forfeit to the
State. Evidence had revealed that· the appellant had been lured into
acting as an intermediary between the seller of the dagga and the
buyer thereof. The appellant had played no part in the conclusion
of the agreement between the seller and the buyer. He had been offered
a reward for R40 for the conveyance of the dagga. The appellant
was 51 years of age and he was a first offender. He was a truck
74 1981 1 SA 966 (A D)
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driver and earned R55 per week.
In reasons for sentence the magistrate had stated that his court
had dealt with " . .. n baie ernstige misdaad". Wessels, J A was of the
opinion that the magistrate had over-emphasized the seriousness of
the offence and the interests of society and had thus not attached
weight to the personal circumstances of the accused. The appellant
had unsuccessfully appealed to the Provincial Division. The Appellate
Division altered the sentence to one of two years' imprisonment which
was conditionally suspended for five years. Botha, A J A dissenting,
was of the opinion that a suitable sentence would have been one of
imprisonment for two years of which one year would be conditionally
suspended.
Although the 1978 Amendment Act came into operation after thousands
of accused persons had been sentenced to the mandatory minimum term
of imprisonment for five years despite the presence of mitigating
factors, it is to be welcomed.
Alth h · t h d b d h . . J . . 75) h houg l a een suggeste to t e maglstrate In antJles t at t e
accused be dealt with in terms of the then section 342 76 ) of the
repealed Criminal Procedure Act, as she had been under the age of
21 years at the time of the cOIIUIlission of the offence, the magistrate
had sentenced her to five years' imprisonment. According to the
charge sheet the accused was 18 years old. She had no previous
convictions. In his reasons for the sentence which contained numerous
75 1978 1 SA 1048 (E)
76 now section 290 of the present Criminal Procedure Act
83
misdirections, the magistrate had among others, stated that "the accused
is a large well developed young woman" I that "by sending an accused
such as this accused to jail other youngsters will be kept from coming
into contact with the sort of people that might lead them astray" and that
the gaols were not the only places where undesirable people were
to be found. The magistrate had stated that had the accused been
older he would have imposed a more severe sentence. The attitude
of the magistrate suggests that he had misinterpreted legislative policy
and had thus considered principles applicable to tariff sentences.
The reviewing judge who had read the magistrate I s reasons with some
amazement, held that the magistrate had misdirected himself and that
he had failed properly to consider all the circumstances of the case
and that, before sentencing the accused to imprisonment for such
a long period he should have called for a social welfare report.
The sentence was set aside and the matter was referred back to the
magistrate to obtain a social welfare report before sentence would
be imposed.
The record shows that ten 'other persons had been involved in the
dagga, quantity of which is not indicated. The magistrate had stated
that "If she had been older a more severe sentence would have been
passed." It is difficult to conceive what would have been a "more
serious sentence" on a first offender.
That portion of the sentence is conditionally suspended does not
. 'f 77)JUStl y a severe sentence. In this case the appellant, a Coloured
77 Allart 1984 2 SA 722 (TPD)
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man aged 26 years, had one unrelated previous conviction. He had
given a small quantity of dagga described as 'n vinger dagga", which he
had had in his possession, to a trap. The appellant had not demanded
payment for the dagga. Apparently he had given the dagga as a present
to the trap who had told him that he was on his way to the border
and that he needed dagga. The trap had, after walking away a few
paces, returned to the appellant and had inserted R2 into the appellant's
pocket. The appellant had later been arrested. No other dagga had
been found in the possession of the appellant. The appellant was
unmarried but maintained his mother and four tJ.:'uLhers and sisters.
The magistrate had sentenced him to five years' imprisonment of which
four years were conditionally suspended.
In his reasons for sentence the magistrate had stated that he had
noted that the appellant had dealt in one cigarette of dagga but
that the small quantity of dagga was not per se a mitigating factor.
According to the magistrate's experience a dealer in dagga was careful
not to be in possession of a large quantity of dagga but carried
a quantity which the consumer would like to buy. Van Dijkhorst,
J was of the opinion that the magistrate had seriously misdirected
himself. The judge went on to say that the appellant was not a dealer
in dagga in the usual sense and that the magistrate had not considered
the circumstances in which the offence had been committed. The judge
said that in the light of what has been said, the sentence imposed
by the magistrate was inappropriate. The fact that four years of
the sentence were conditionally suspended did not change the stand-
point. The appeal against sentence was upheld. The sentence was
set aside and was substituted for by one of imprisonment for one
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year, conditionally suspended for four years. The criticism by the
Appeal court is to be welcomed. It is surprising to note that, although
the Supreme Court gave guidance to magistrates as early as 1972,78) they.
still ignore principles of sentencing.
6.2 Statistics
A sample of 30 sentences imposed by the Lower Umfolozi (Empangeni)
District Court was obtained. The period covered is January to September
1984. Many accused persons who were originally charged with dealing
in dagga, alternatively, being in possession of dagga, were convicted
of the latter. The sentences were imposed by three magistrates attached
to this court. The source of information was the court records.
It was, however, not possible to establish from the records the
circumstances in which dealing in dagga had taken place. Evidence
was recorded mechanically. In most cases evidence had not been
transcribed. The reviewable sentences had been confirmed on review.
Juding from the available factors, namely, the record of the accused,
their ages, and the quantity of dagga, the sentences seem to be in
accordance with justice. There are no indications that government
policy considerations adversely influenced the sentences. The following
table shows the sentences.
78 Shangase and Others, Nkosi and Others, Mamase and Others, Kroutz. en
Andere and Kukarie en Andere cases
...
RACE AGE OF THE SEX QUANTITY OF DAGGA PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS SENTENCE
ACCUSED (if any)
Black 22 m less than 115 grams nil 18 months imprisonment which 9
months are conditionally suspended
Black 48 m more than 115 grams nil 2 years' imprisonment of which 1
year is conditionally suspended
Black 24 m less than 115 grams nil 8 months' imprisonment conditionally
suspended
Black 42 m 10,800kg 3 unrelated 5 years' imprisonment of which 2
years are conditionally suspended
Coloured 27 m less than 115 grams nil 2 years' imprisonment conditionally
suspended
Black 22 m 423 grams nil 18 months conditionally suspended
Black 37 f less than 115 grams nil 12 months' imprisonment of which 6
months are conditionally suspended
Black 28 m less than 115 grams nil 18 months '. imprisonment of which 9
months are conditionally suspended
Black 52 f less than 115 grams nil 18 months' imprisonment conditionally
suspended ex>0\
Black 21 m less than 115 grams nil 18 months' imprisonment conditionally
suspended
Black 20 m less than 115 grams nil 1 year imprisonment of which 6
months are conditionally suspended
Black 35 f more than 115 grams nil 2 years
,
imprisonment of which 1 year
is conditionally suspended
Black 25 f more than 115 grams nil 2 years' imprisonment of which 1 year
is conditionally suspended
Black 46 m 300 grams nil 2 years of which 18 months are
suspended
Black 31 m less than 115 grams nil 18 months imprisonment of which 9
months are conditionally suspended
Black 30 f less than 115 grams nil 18 months imprisonment of which 9
months are conditionally suspended
Black 39 m less than 115 grams nil 2 years imprisonment of which 1 year
is conditionally suspended
Black 35 f less than 115 grams nil 12 months' imprisonment of which 6
months are conditionally suspended
~
RACE AGE OF THE SEX QUANTITY OF DAGGA PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS SENTENCE
ACCUSED (if any)
Black 38 f 60 grams nil 2 years of which 1 year is
conditionally suspended
Black 28 m less than 115 grams nil 12 months' imprisonment of which 6
months are conditionally suspended
Black 40 f less than 115 grams nil 18 months' imprisonment of which 9
months are conditionally suspended
Black 22 f less than 115 grams nil 2 year's imprisonment of which 1
year is conditionally suspended
Black 40 f less than 115 grams nil 18 months' imprisonment of which 12
months are suspended
Black 48 m less than 115 grams nil 18 months' imprisonment of which 9
months are suspended
Black 38 f less than 115 grams nil 18 months' imprisonment of which 9
months are suspended
Black 31 m less than 115 grams nil 9 months imprisonment
Black 23 f more than 115 grams nil 2 years' imprisonment of which 1
year is conditionally suspended (Xl
-.....J
Black 42 m less than 115 grams nil 9 months' imprisonment
Black 32 f less than 115 grams nil 12 months' imprisonment of which 6
months are conditionally suspended
Black 47 m less than 115 grams 2 unrelated 9 months' imprisonment
TABLE
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1 2 3 4
QUANTITY AGE OF ACCUSED PREVIOUS SEX
OF DAGGA CONVICTIONS FOR
- CONTRAVEliTI{G SECTION 2





4 1 20-22 years 5 Nil 4 1
6 2 23-30 years 7 Nil 4 3
9 1 31-40 11 Nil 3 8
2 3 41-50 6 Nil 6 Nil
1 1 51+ 1 Nil Nil 1
- - - - --
22 8 30 17 13- - - - -
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TABLE (continued)
S ENT E NeE S
- 12 months 13 - 18 months 19 - 24 months 3 - 4 years 5 years
1 3 1 Nil Nil
3 2 2 n:..l tJil
4 3 4 Nil Nil
2 1 2 Nil 1
Nil 1 Nil Nil Nil
-- - -- -- --
.ill- 1Q _9_ ~ _1_
ne of the 30 accused had unrelated previous convictions.
L the terms of imprisonment of 12 months and above were either wholly suspended or
~tions of at least half of each sentence was suspended.
-ee terms of nine months' imprisonment were not suspended. The accused who
sentenced to five years' imprisonment had dealt in dagga weighing 10,800 kilograms.
f'
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6.3 Section 2(b) (Being in possession of dagga)
6.3.1 Introduction
A study of reported cases shows that innnediately after the Act came
into operation magistrates experienced difficulty in applying the
provisions of this sub-section.
6.3.2 Cases
In Shangase and Others 79) 21 cases had been submitted for review
before the Natal Provincial Division. There was one appeal case.
According to Harcourt, J magistrates in Natal had experienced difficulties
of interpretation of certain provisions of the Act which had been
brought into operation on 6 December 1971. To improve the situation
and in an endeavour to assist magistrates in Natal in understanding
the application of the manifestly difficult task, the Judge-President
had directed a special sitting of a Full Court to consider a number
of cases which presented different problems. The courts would give
a detailed and comprehensive decision which might serve as a guide
in other review cases and in cases to be tried by magistrates in
Natal.
The Chief Magistrate of Durban had arranged for the magistrates of
his district to provide a statement of their views. These magistrates
"were widely experienced".80) In
79 supra.
80 at 412B
their memoranda the magistrates
-~-
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had stressed the objectives of the Minister of Social Welfare in
regard to the nature of the offences and penalties in t~e Act. The
magistrates had quoted from Hansard where the objectives of the Minister
were contained to the effect that it was intended to deal "mercilessly"
with persons who wittingly evaded or contravened the Act. 81 ) Mr Justice
Harcourt remarked that it was a well-established principle that in
interpreting an Act of Parliament no regard can be made by a court
to debates on the subject-matter being considered by the legislature
before the act of legislation is determined upon.
As regards sentence the Judge referred to the words of
Rumpff, J A82 ) to the effect that "What has to be considered is the
triad consisting of the crime, the offender and the interests of
society." As regards "circumstances justifying the imposi tion
of a lighter sentence" referred to in the Act,83) Harcourt, J, after
referring to several authorities, stated that the following factors
appeared to him to fall within the definition of the "circumstances,,:84)
"( i) the age of the accused and
his condi tion particularly
in regard to his cultural,
physical., . mental and emotional
states and any established
immaturity whether attributable
to such states, lack of
sophistication or education
or the likei
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the limited quantity and nature
of the dependence-producing
substance in his possession
incl uding the fact that dagga
is almost certainly not as
dangerous and harmful as some
of the substances with which
it is coupled in the relevant
penal provisions of the Act;
the absence of previous convictions
or, if any exist, the nature,
number and dates thereof and
the time which elapsed since
the last relevant such conviction;









the local condi tions and incidence
of the ·specific crime in the
area in question as indicating
that severe penal ties are not
particularly called for;
any pressure exerted on the
accused by persons in authority
over, or having infI uence upon,
the accused, for example, orders
(or perhaps even requests)
from an employer, parent, husband
or the like as well as duress
or intimidation;
as a limited and transient
consideration, the question
whether or not the offence
had been commi tted so soon
after the coming into force
of the Act that the particular
accused was unlikely to have
been aware of the new and more
drastic approach to the whole
question of dagga;
the probable effect upon the
accused of a long or substantial
period of imprisonment;
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(x) any other factor, bearing on
the commission of the crime,
which reduces the moral
blameworthiness of the accused".
The judge emphasized that courts should regard and consider the cumulative
effect of these
J concurred.
factors as may be relevant. Kennedy, J and Muller,
The judges then applied the principles to the individual facts of
the various cases which were being considered on review. Some of
these cases will be discussed to show the effect of policy considerations
on the sentences.
Mzini85) . In this case the accused, a 22 year-old man had been convicted
of possessing 100 grams of dagga in a residential compound. He had
a clean record. A magistrate had sentenced him to imprisonment for
12 months of which six months were conditionally suspended for three
years. The magistrate had found that "circumstances" in terms of section
7 existed but he had regarded 100 grams as a "large quanti ty" of dagga.
rhe court ordered that the operation of all except three months thereof
should be suspended on the terms imposed by the magistrate. The
court had properly taken into account the age of the accused, the
novelty of the very severe impact of the Act and that the quantity
of dagga was not particularly large.
Mhlongo. 86 ) The d ° h Oaccuse In t lS
85 at 436
86 at 436
case had possessed approximately
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2 grams of dagga in a gaol where he was detained. The accused was
24 years of age and had two previous convictions for assault with
intent to do grevious bodily harm. The magistrate had found that
"circumstances" existed and he had sentenced the accused to imprisonment
for six months.
It was submitted that it would be appropriate to suspend portion
of this sentence. The Attorney-general opposed the submission stating
that the offence was aggravated by being an instance of smuggling
dagga into gaol and that the accused had two relatively serious previous
convictions. The court was not persuaded that any grounds existed
for interference with the discretionary punishment imposed by the
magistrate. The sentence was confirmed. The sentence seems appropriate.
87 )
88)
Mthembu. The accused, a 25 year-old man had possessed one cigarette
of dagga weighing approximately 1.77 grams. He had possessed the
dagga while walking on a main road. He had three previous convictions,
namely, one for possession of a dangerous weapon and two counts of
housebreaking with intent to steal and theft. A magistrate had sentenced
the accused to imprisonment f or two years of which 21 months were
conditionally suspended. In his reasons for sentence the magistrate
had stated that he did not regard the small quantity of dagga involved
as a potential "circumstance".
On behalf of the accused it was argued that the magistrate should
have found that circumstances existed which justified the imposition
87 see Kroutz case footnotes 41 and 42 of this chapter
88 at 437 C
..
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of a lighter sentence and that part of such sentence should have
been suspended. The court was of the opinion that it could not be
said that the magistrate had misdirected himself.
confirmed.
The sentence was
The previous convictions of the accused did not relate to dagga.
The accused had possessed a small quantity of dagga. The offence
had been committed soon after the coming into force of the Act.
The accused was unlikely to have been aware of the new and more drastic
approach to the question of dagga. The accused had possessed a very
small quantity of dagga. These factors considered cumulatively should
have led the magistrate to the conclusion that circumstances existed.
Justice would then have been done if the accused had been sentenced
to say, imprisonment for six months of which three months were
condition~lly suspended. The sentence imposed by the magistrate
and confirmed on review cannot, with respect, be justified by the
fact that a greater part of it was suspended. It has been said in
this work that a suspended sentence remains part of the sentence
of the court and may possibly be served.
89)In Mpanza the accused had possessed half a cigarette of dagga
mixed with tobacco. The accused was a youth of 19 years and had
no previous convictions. The magistrate had sentenced him to two
years' imprisonment of which 18 months were conditionally suspended.
The reviewing court was of the opinion that this was a case in which
the age of the accused should have been carefully investigated and
fixed and that, depending on such fixed age, the court should have
89 at 438 H
treated him as a juvenile.
96
The court was further of the opinion
that it would be undesirable then to impose a whipping, as the accused
had already been in gaol for just over one month. The sentence was
altered to that of three months' imprisonment, the whole sentence
conditionally suspended for two years. The substantial differences
between the two sentences is a reflection of lack of direciton on
the part of the magistrate.
The case of Moletshe90 ) also reflects a misdirection. In casu the
accused had possessed one cigarette of dagga. He had no previous
convictions whatsoever. He was 22 years of age. The magistrate
had sentenced him to two years I imprisonment of which 18 months were
conditionally suspended.
On review it was submitted on behalf of the accused that the small
quantity of dagga, absence of previous convictions and the age of
the accused should have been considered by the court a quo as
circumstances justifying the imposition of a lighter sentence. The
Attorney-general was also of the same opinion. The court was of
the opinion that an appropriate sentence was one of three months'
imprisonment, the whole sentence conditionally suspended. The court
ordered the immediate release of the accused from prison. The magistrate
had ignored principles of sentencing.
That the policy of the legislature was the main consideration by magistrates
before imposing sentence is also demonstrated in the case of Linda. 91 ) The
90 at 439 D
91 at 439 H
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accused, aged about 52 years, had possessed one cigarette of dagga.
He had no previous convictions of any sort and had, in mitigation,
pleaded that he was an elderly person. The magistrate had, however,
sentenced him to imprisonment f or two years of which 18 months were
suspended on certain conditions.
On review the court was of the opinion that "circumstances" were preeent
and it altered the sentence to that of three months' imprisonment
conditionally suspended for three years. The court ordered the immediate
release of the accused. The decision of the reviewing court is to
be welcomed. There is an alarming disparity between the two sentences.
92)
In Magubane the magistrate had not explained the nature and the
effects of section 7 relating to "circumstances" to the accused. The 21
year-old accused had possessed one ounce of dagga. He had three
previous convictions for attempted robbery, theft and being an idle
person, respectively.
On review the sentence of two years I imprisonment of which 21 months
were conditionally suspended, was set aside and the case was remitted
to the magistrate to enable him to explain the nature and effect
of section 7 to the accused and, after hearing any representations
which the accused might wish to make, and to impose sentence afresh.
In any event the sentence was obviously inappropriate. The quantity
of dagga, the age of the accused and the absence of related previous
convictions justified a lighter sentence.
92 at 442 H
•
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In Nzama,93) the accused, a youth of 19 years of age had been sentenced
to imprisonment for 2 years of which 18 months were conditionally
suspended, after a conviction of possession of one partly smoked
cigarette which contained a mixture of dagga and tobacco weighing
approximately one-sixteenth of an ounce.
On review the sentence was set aside and substituted for by one of
three months' imprisonment, the operation of which was wholly suspended
for two years on certain conditions. The magistrate could have dealt
with the accused in terms of sections 342 or 345 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 56 of 1955.
a sentence of shock.
The sentence which he had imposed induced
In Ngcobo94) the accused who was about 23 years of age had possessed
three cigarettes of dagga weighing three ounces. He had two previous
convictions, one for housebreaking with intent to steal and theft
and the other for unlawful possession of dagga in contravention of
section 61(1)(d) of the repealed Act 13 of 1928. The magistrate
had apparently erroneously regarded the last-mentioned conviction
as a previous conviction for the purpose of bringing into operation
the increased penalties in section 2. The magistrate had sentenced
the accused to imprisonment for five years of which four and a half
years were conditionally suspended.
On review the court was of the opinion that, because of the circumstances
93 at 440
94 at 444 A
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of the accused and his previous convictions it could not be said
that "circumstances" were present. However, the court felt that
the magistrate had misdirected himself in considering the previous
conviction in terms of Act 13 of 1928 for the purpose of imposing
f h Ad d' . 95)an increased sentence in terms of section 2 0 t e rtct un er lSCUSSlon.
The sentence was set aside and in its place there was substituted
that of two years' imprisonment of which 18 months were conditionally
suspended.
Another case which illustrates a misdirection on the part of the
magistrate is that of Khuzwayo.96) The accused, a youth of 21 years of
age had been convicted of possessing half an ounce of dagga while
walking on a public road. He had a previous conviction for contravening
section 61(1)(d) of the repealed Act.
97
) As in the previous case,
the magistrate had incorrectly regarded the previous conviction as
resulting _in the accused being convicted before him on a second or
subsequent occasion. The magistrate had then sentenced the accused
to imprisonment for five years of which four and a half years were
conditionally suspended.
On review it was considered that as the accused was alleged to be
21 years of age there should have been an investigation into his
precise age with a view to the possibility of dealing with him as
95 InShangase and Others it was held that section 2 does not relate to
previous convictions under the repealed Act, 13 of 1928. See also
the Kroutz (at 924 G) and the Kukarie (at 914) cases
96 at 443 D
97 13 of 1928
a juvenile.
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The Attorney-general suggested to the court that as
the accused had already served about five weeks of imprisonment the
sentence should be altered to one of three months' imprisonment,
the whole sentence conditionally suspended. The court gave effect
to the suggestion of the Attorney-general by deleting the sentence,
in its place substituting one of three months' imprisonment conditionally
suspended for two years.
It is considered unnecessary to discuss all the cases the court dealt
with in the Shangase and Others case. The influence of policy is
,.
clear from some of the sentences. The Full Bench of the Natal Provincial
Division consisting of Harcourt, J (Kennedy, J and Muller, J concurring)
with NC Masters, SC, Attorney-general, Natal, for the State and
J J Kriek, SC (with him P W Thirion), for the accused at the request
of the court, 'arguing on review, are to be congratulated on their
success in giving such useful guide-lines and in ensuring that justice
,was done to accused persons who had been victims of misdirection
on the part of magistrates caused by either over-emphasis on
legislative policy or misinterpretation of such policy.
In Mamase and Others 98 )the Full Bench, as in the case of Shangase
and Others,99) had to deal with cases which had been submitted by
magistrates for review. It appears from the arguments that magistrates
in the Eastern Cape had misdirected themselves in some aspects such





as previous convictions for purposes of increased sentences in terms
of section 2 of the Act under discussion. The court dealt with the
provisions of section 7 relating to circumstances justifying the
imposition of a lighter sentence and enumerated factors which, in
its opinion, fell within the definition of "circumstances". These factors
are similar to those enumerated in the Shangase and Others case. 100) The
court had had an opportunity of reading and studying the decision
in the latter case and it was "substantially in agreement with the
conclusions reached by the learned Judge". 101)
In the Transvaal as well, magistrates experienced problems in applying
the provisions of the Act. In Nkosi and Others 102 ) the Full Bench was
concerned with 26 review cases relating to possession of or dealing
in dagga in contravention of section 2 of the Act. Arguing f or the
accused at the request of the court were D J Curlewis, S C (with
him A C Meyer), and C N van der WaIt, se, Deputy Attorney-general
(with him A R Erasmus), f or the State. Referring to the Shangase
and Others case, Marais, J said that, that judgment had been made
available to them and to counsel who appeared before them, shortly
before the argument began. The judges said that the judgment contained
a full and careful analysis of many of the problems with which they
were concerned, and that it had been of the greatest assistance to
them.





in their reasons for their sentences submitted in answer to queries
by judge before whom the cases had first come on automatic review,
had referred, in justification of the sentences they had imposed,
to the remarks by the Minister of Social Welfare during the debates
on the measure in Parliament. The court remarked that it was not
permissible for a court, in applying a statute, to have regard to
statements made in the course of debates in Parliament and that the
meaning of the provisions and the intention of the legislature must
be gathered from the terms of the Act itself. The court quoted with
approval Harcourt, J in the Shangase and Others case when he enumerated
what he considered to be factors falling within the definition of
circumstances justifying the imposition of a lighter sentence.
The court then dealt with each of the 26 cases, the particulars of
which, unfortunately, do not appear in the report.
103)
In Strauss, the accused, a 18 year-old White and first offender,
had been convicted of possession of dagga. A magistrate had sentenced
him to imprisonment for six months of which five months were conditionally
suspended. Although this sentence was confirmed on review the court
was of the opinion that it was wrong to sentence the accused to
imprisonment without a report from a welfare officer or investigation
under section 30 of the Act (enquiry with a view to establishing
whether or not he should be committed to a rehabilitation centre)
and that the action by the court a quo was in conflict with the spirit
of the Act. There had been a delay in sending the record for review.
When the case was being reviewed the accused had already served the
103 1973 2 SA 84 (OPD)
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unsuspended portion of the sentence.
confirmed the sentence.
In the circumstances the court
In Sacks, 104) the accused, a youth aged 20 years, had after conviction
for possession of two ounces of dagga, stated in mitigation that
he had been a drug addict for seven years and that he wished to be
sent to a rehabilitation centre. He had no previous convictions.
The magistrate had imposed a sentence of imprisonment for two years.
On review it was held that the magistrate should have called in the
assistance of the probation officer who had been in contact with
the accused and that such assistance would have enabled the magistrate
to decide whether or not to stop the trial and order the holding
of an enquiry in terms of the Act. 105 ) It was held, therefore, that the
matter should be remitted to the magistrate for reconsideration.
The magistrate ought to have considered that "prevention rather than
punishment should be our motto". 106)
Although the magistrate had found that "circumstances" were present in
Mphuthi 107) he was of the opinion that he had no option but to impose
imprisonment for two years on the accused, a Black male of 42 years
104 1972 2 SA 646 (OPD)
105 section 30
106 supra footnote 13 of this chapter
107 1972 2 SA 645 (OPD)
of age and first offender who had been convicted of being in possession
of one gramme of dagga. On review the sentence was set aside. The
case was remitted to the magistrate to consider the provisions of
section 7 and then to impose an appropriate sentence. From what was
said by eXPerts at the South African Conference on dagga in Durban, 108)
dagga cannot be said to be a very harmful drug. 109) It is therefore
unbelievable that, for being in possession of one gramme of dagga,
a first offender was sentenced to imprisonment for two years.
In Erasmus,110) a Coloured youth aged 20 years and first offender
had possessed 1,5 grammes of dagga. Despite the existence of the
circumstances justifying the imposition of a. lighter sentence the
magistrate had sentenced him to imprisonment for seven months. In
his reasons for the sentence the magistrate had stated that the Act
had prescribed maximum and minimum sentences. He had referred to
the case of Kroutz and Andere,l1"l) where it was said:
"Die swaar strawwe deur die
Wet bepaal is egter T1 aand uiding
van die ernstige lig waarin
die wetgewing hierdie oortredings
sien I en di t moet terdee in
gedagte gehou word by die ople
van straf."
108 supra
109 see the views of DuPre, Le Roux and Botha,footnote 13 of this
chapter
110 1976 3 SA 131 (OPD)
111 supra at 926 H .
105
The magistrate had stated:
"Teen die agtergrond van hierdie
riglyne het die hof oorweging
geskenk aan n vonnis wat by
die beskuldigde in sy omstandighede
sal pas. Sy skoon rekord is
n strafversagtende faktor.
Die klein hoeveelheid dagga
is in sy aanmerking geneem
binne die konteks van die omringende
omstandighede. Beskuldigde se seJf'
dat hy dit rook. Die hoeveelheid
dagga is nie per se strafversaytend
nie - S V Kroutz, supra."
Theron, J said that the usual sentence for a person with a clean
record who was convicted of contravening the section in that he had
in his possession or had used a small quantity of dagga, is a wholly
suspended sentence of four to nine months I imprisonment. The judge
went on to say that great weight should be attached' especially to
youth as a mitigating factor and that a young man of 20 years is
not forced to acquaint himself with the inside of a gaol if it is
in any way possible to avoid doing so.
The court confirmed the sentence of imprisonment for seven months
but ordered that the whole sentence be conditionally suspended for
three years. The sentence allowed by Mr Justice Theron seems to
be in accordance with justice.
In Johnson
l12
) the accused, a 56 year-old Coloured man had been convicted
of possessing 0,875 grammes of dagga in the Worcester prison where
112 1980 3 SA 188 (CPD)
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he was serving a sentence of imprisonment for five years for dealing
in dagga. The magistrate had imposed four years' imprisonment.
The accused had other previous convictions including theft and assault
with intent. to do grevious bodily harm and possession of dagga in
terms of the repealed Act. On review ~ Broeksma ~ J stated that the
abolition by means of Act 76 of 1978~ of the minimum sentence for
possession of dagga in contravention of the section justifies in
itself the viewpoint that the legislature had come to the conclusion
that the discretion of the court in regard to sentence should be
minimally limited and that it was not desirable that a minimum of
two years' imprisonment for a first offence and five years' imprisonment
for a subsequent offence should serve as a starting-point for the
imposition of sentence. The court went on to say that it would frustrate
the present objects of the legislature if the heavy sentences which
were imposed in the past for the possession of a reasonably small
quantity of dagga should serve as a guideline for the imposition
of sentences which~ in the light of the present dispensation~ are
unrealistic. In considering the sentences which were imposed before
the abolition of the minimum sentences the judicial officer ought,
as far as possible, to attempt to determine what seutences would
have been imposed if the present dispensation had then existed.
The court stated also that pursuant to the abolition of the particular
minimum sentences under Act 41 of 1971 it was no longer necessary
for a court to decide whether mitigating circumstances within the
meaning of section 7 of the Act were present and the quantity of
dagga involved in the offence is a factor which, together with all
other applicable considerations can be taken into account in the
107
determination of an equitable sentence. The court concluded by saying
that the judges of the Cape Provincial Division were agreed that
sentences of more than two years' effective imprisonment (for
contraventions of 'section 2(b) of Act 41 of 1971), even where the
offence was committed in prison and where the accused had previous
convictions for possession of or
imposed in very exceptional cases.
of imprisonment for two years.
dealing in dagga, should only be
The sentence was altered to one
The statement of the judge to the effect that the heavy sentences
which were imposed in the grim past for the possession of relatively
small quantities of dagga should not serve as a guideline for the
imposition of sentences in terms of the new dispensation, is to be
welcomed. The judge correctly pointed out that,. in the light of
the new penal provisions, those sentences were unrealistic.
6.4 - Statistics
A sample of 100 sentences imposed by the Lower Umfolozi (Empangeni)
District court for contravening the sub-section was obtained. These
sentences were imposed between 1 February and 31 July 1984 and were
chosen at random. The sentences were imposed by three magistrates
attached to this court. The sample was obtained from court records.
As evidence was recorded mechanically it was not possible to establish
from the records the circumstances in which dagga had been possessed.
In nearly all the cases evidence had not been transcribed.
The table shows that four of the 100 accused had previous convictions
...
for contravening the section.
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The table further shows that three
were sentenced to imprisonment exceeding six months. One was committed
to a rehabilitation centre. Fourteen youths were sentenced to whipping
with a light cane in terms of section 294 of the Criminal Procedure
Act. The average was 4 "cuts". These youths were first offenders.
Although whipping is drastic, criticism of the sentences would not
be justified. Suspended sentences would have been inappropriate.
f'
It has been said earlier that a severe sentence cannot be justified
by the fact tb-at it is suspended. The alternative would have been
dealing with them in terms of section 290 of the Criminal Act l13 ) if
evidence warranted such a step. It can therefore be said that from
the available information all the sentences appear to have been
influenced by guidelines given by our Provincial Divisions, especially
in the case of Shangase and Others 114) and are therefore in accordance
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NUMBER YEARS NUMBER MALE FEMALE
LESS THAN MORE THAN
10 GRAMS 10 GRAMS
4 Nil 16-18 4 Nil 4 Nil 4
14 Nil 19-20 14 Nil 14 Nil 10
41 15 21-30 56 2 55 1 Nil
14 5 31-40 19 2 18 1 Nil
5 Nil 41-50 5 Nil 5 Nil Nil
1 1 51+ 2 .Nil 2 Nil Nil- - - - - - -
79 21 100 4 98 2 14- - - - - - -
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ABLE (continued)
S ENT E N C E .8
3S THAN 3 MONTHS' 3-6 MONTHS' 7-12 MONTHS' 13 MONTHS - 2 YEARS' ICOMMITED TO




Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil
Nil x- Nil Nil Nil4_
lOX 33x 1x 2x Nil
-.-




2 Nil Nil Nil Nil
Indicates that the whole sentence was conditionally suspended.
Indicates that the sentence was not suspended.
Under "3 - 6 months' imprisonment" two of the four sentences were conditionally




The Act empowered magistrates to impose sentences which they normally
would not have imposed.
Some magistrates stated in their reasons for sentence that they had
considered the speech of the Minister of Social Welfare made during
debates in Parliament. Unfortunately they did not seriously consider
other relevant factors, thus misdirecting - themselves. Eventually'
they imposed sentences which raised a "sense of shock".
As regards section 2(a) some magistrates did not consider alternatives
to imprisonment in respect of juvenile accused.
After the Act had been amended to the effect that sentences could
be suspended, some magistrates were adamant that the \\Thole sentence
could not be suspended.
Concerning section 2(b) it appears that, although section 7 applied
as from the commencement of the Act, it was in some cases overshadowed
by government policy considerations. I t is surprising to note that
" experienced "and high-ranking magistrates were involved in this
glaring 'error. This is apparent from the Shangase and Others case.
They did not impose appropriate sentences on accused per sons below
the age of 21 years in some cases.
What follows relates to both sub-sections (i.e. 2(a) and 2(b)).
The "social evel" has, despite such heavy sentences, not been "stamped
out" .
112
d . . P 1· 115)The Minister of Law and Or er, answering a questlon ln ar lament,
stated that during the previous year the South African Police had
confiscated 589 183 kg of dagga worth about R300 000 000.
The decisions of our superior courts and amendments which have been
effected to the penal provisions are to be welcomed.
116)
Some laywers
feel that the abolition of the minimum sentences and the "no suspension,
discharge with a caution or reprimand and postponement of passing of
sentence" clauses were a move towards justice.
legislature should amend the Act to introduce fines.
They feel that the
If proceedings of magistrates' courts were not reviewable, it is
very clear from the cases that many accused persons who had contravened
the two sub-sections would have .served unnecessarily long terms of
imprisonment. Although some sentences were set aside or reduced
on review or appeal, accused persons had been in prison for some
considerable periods.
The step which was taken by the Natal Provincial Division in Shangase
I
f" and Others case and other Provincial Divisions, of providing magistrates
with guide-lines is highly appreciated. Although some sentences
were interfered with on appeal or review, some accused persons, as
a result of inappropriate terms of imprisonment, apparently lost
their employment or experienced family problems. Some of these problems
could result in irreparable losses.
115 Hansard, Apr~l 14, 1983 Columns 973 and 974
116 All 25 Black magistrates attending a refresher course at the
Institute for Public Service and Vocational Training, University
of Zululand during the period 22-11-1983 and 2-12-1983.
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Appeal and reviewing judges have, through their judgments, succeeded
in changing the sentencing policy of our magistrates. Some magistrates
believed that they were applying the policy of the legislature when
they imposed unduly severe sentences, disregarding other considerations.
It can also be said that some magistrates misinterpreted the sentencing
policy of the legislature to the detriment of accused persons. The
Legislature did well by changing its policy through the 1978 Amendment
Act.
The Department of Justice ought to take possible steps to prevent
or reduce inappropriate sentences by, for example, causing seminars
t b h ld t d · f f . h 1 " 11 7) fo e e a l erent reglons were pena prOVlSlons 0 new
statutory measures should be discussed by magistrates, before their
application takes effect.






Section 13 1) confers jurisdiction on a magistrate's court to impose,
in the case of a first conviction for the theft of stock, imprisonment
for a period not exceeding two years or whipping not exceeding ten
strokes or both such whipping and imprisonment for any period not
exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding R2 000 or both such fine
and imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.
In the case of a second or subsequent conviction the section provides
for imprisonment for any period not exceeding three years or whipping
not exceeding ten strokes or both such whipping and imprisonment
for any period not exceeding three years.
2. POLICY
Reading the Stock Theft Bill a second time, the Minister of Justice,
among others, said:
1 Act 57 of 1959. Some cases relating to sentences imposed on
stock thieves convicted of contravening the 1923 Stock Theft
Act (26 of 1923) will be referred to. The latter Act made provision
f or the maximum period of imprisonment of two and a half years
and the maximum fine of RSOO. Magistrates' courts had jurisdiction
to impose these sentences.
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"In the past agricultural unions
continually made all sorts
of requests to me to tidy up
the law in regard to stock
theft. In this House also
hon. members have from time
to time asked that strong measures
should be adopted wi th regard
to stock thieves. "2)
The Minister further said that maximum penalties had been provided
for in the Bill.
From the speech of the Minister it is obvious that stock farmers
have influenced the policy of the Government concerning sentence
on stock thieves. From circulars which have been issued to public
r'
prosecutors in the province of Natal by Attorneys-general of this
province it appears that stock farmers complain to the latter about
what they consider "inadequate sentences in stock theft cases".3) In the
first-mentioned circular the Attorney-general, among others, said
that he had received numerous complaints about the prevalence of
stock theft and about inadequate sentences in stock theft cases.
He said that although sentences are obviously a matter for the discretion
of presiding officers, prosecutors could assist presiding officers
by placing information before the court by way of evidence on sentence,
as well as by arguing that severe sentences should be imposed as
a deterrent. The Attorney-general suggested to public prosecutors
that local police, as well as local farmers could often give evidence
of the prevalence of stock theft in their areas.
2 Hansard, February 2, 1959 column 291
3 Circulars 11/80 dated 3 June 1980 and 3/81 dated 11 May 1981
(unpublished)
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In Circular No 3/81 the Attorney-general reminded public prosecutors
that it was in~ the public interest that offenders in stock theft
cases should be adequately punished and that, to determine an appropriate
sentence the court is entitled to the assistance of both the prosecutor
and the defending counsel. Paragraph 2 of the circular provides





In all cases where the val ue
of the stock invol ved exceeds
RI 000.
In the case of a first offender
who is charged with the theft
of two or more head of cattle.
In all cases where it appears
to the prosecutor that a sentence
in excess of that authorised
by section 1 3 of the Stock
Theft Act ought to be imposed.
Where the particular circumstances
of a case appear to warrant
a prosecution in the Regional
Court. "
What has been said clearly shows that theft of stock is viewed in
a serious light. It is unfortunate that many accused persons charged
with stock theft appear unrepresented. The prosecution policy is
likely to affect them adversely. One can only hope that, after hearing
the evidence of local farmers and local police, magistrates do advise
unrepresented accused to present evidence in mitigation of sentence
and that they assist such accused persons in presenting such evidence.





"The Stock Theft Act, 57 of
1 959, does not provide any
penalty for the theft of stock,
nor does it create any special
offence of stock theft. The
offence remains theft but it
is subject to the various special
provisions of the Act. However
no minimum or maximum penal ty
is prescribed by the Act except
under section 14 which for
present purposes is irrelevant.
Any person found guil ty of
the theft of stock is punishable
within the limits of its
jurisdiction. What section
1 3 of the Stock Theft Act does
is to increase the criminal
jurisdiction of magistrates I
courts. In so doing, it does
not, in my view, intend to
provide specially heavy sentences.
This section rather indicates
an appreciation on the part
of the Legislature of the frequency
wi th which this offence is
committed in circumstances
rendering the crime a comparatively
serious one. The jurisdiction
of magistrates I courts is enhanced
to enable them to deal wi th
such cases and to avoid the
necessity of indicting the
majority of them before a regional
or a Supreme Court. Thus,
it would seem to be a misdirection
to say that the ~eg):SLature
has provided heavy punishment
for stock theft". 4)
Referring to the 1923 Stock Theft Act, Van den Heever, J said that
the Legislature had "seen fi t to visi t very severe penal ties upon stock
theft, out of all proportion to the sanctions conceived in protection
of other classes of property. It is not for the courts to question
4 Tshawana 1969 2 SA 252 (E) at 253.
in this chapter
The case is discussed later
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the policy of the Legislature but to administer the law as it stands. liS)
In the light of the statement of Kannemeyer, J in the preceding paragraph
and that of Wessels, J, 6) Mr Justice Van den Heever was, with respect,
mistaken about the effect of the Act. I t cannot theref ore be said
that the sentencing policy of the Legislature is that heavy sentences
be imposed on stock thieves.
courts.
3. CASES
It is the sentencing policy of the
In Jacob en n Ander 7) two Black accused aged 52 and 27 years respectively,
had been convicted of the theft of one sheep, worth three pounds,
in terms of the 1923 Act, the property of a farmer in Postmasburg.
The magistrate had sentenced each of the accused to imprisonment
for six months with compulsory labour.
convictions.
Both accused had no previous
.'
Reviewing the proceedings,Mr Justice Diemont said:
"Ek het opgemerk dat in die
groot meerderheid van hierdie
sake geen poging aangewend
word om die omstandighede te
ondersoek of om vas te stel
of daar enige versagtende
omstandighede bestaan nie.
Die gebruiklike vonnis ses
maande gevangenisstraf met
dwangarbeid word eenvoud.ig
opgele. Mynsinsiens is dit





Moqena 1943 OPD 61 at 62
Hemley en n Ander 1960 1 SA 397 CGWLD) at 398
1959 2 SA 269 (GWLD)
at 269
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The judge then referred to the statement of Judge van den Heever.
9
) He
then said that in all stock theft cases in which non-Europeans had
stolen from their employers and in which the meat had been consumed
by the accused or his family the court ought to examine the complaint
to determine whether the accused was an employee, what his rations
and wages were. In the case where he received no ration of meat whether
it was possible for him to obtain it lawfully elsewhere. If it appeared
from the circumstances that the accuserl. and his family suffered from
a shortage of meat and that the employer was in a measure responsible
therefor, then this should be a mitigating factor which ought to influence
the magistrate in imposing sentence. In casu no such evidence had
been led.
The sentences were set aside and the case was referred back to the
magistrate so that the complainant and the two accused should be recalled
to place evidence before the court.
In Mkwanazi 10) the appellant, a Black, had been convicted of the theft
9 !n Moqena case (supra).
10 1960 2 SA 248 (NPD)
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of two head of cattle, the property of a White butcher. The magistrate
had sentenced him to undergo six months' imprisonment. The accused
was a first offender. In his reasons for sentence the magistrate
had stated that stock theft in his district was a common occurrence
and the majority of farmers and Black peasants were stock farmers
and that the offence could therefore not be treated too leniently.
Mr Justice Jansen said that a sentence of six months' imprisonment
for a first conviction is certainly not a light one. The judge said,
however, that it would be difficult to say that it aroused a sense
of shock, especially if it was borne in mind that the accused had'
occupied a position of trust. The accused had been a purchaser of
cattle on behalf of the complainant and had, without any mandate to
do so, exchanged two of the cattle purchased and paid for by the
complainant, for two of his own, after ownership had passed to the
complainant.
The judge felt that the mere fact that the magistrate in effect had
found that the complainant had been compensated did not in any appreciable
degree derogate from this point of view.
Although the accused had breached his position of trust he deserved
a lenient sentence. He was a fir st off ender and had compensated the
victim. A first offender should, as far as possible, be kept out
of gaol. 11) "There';s the hum °t . t th t 't . 11.... an~ ar~an argumen a ~ ~s genera y
more humane to leave an individual with his family and (where applicable)
11 Ashworth 429-430 Hiemstra 578, 583 Harcourt: A B 'Swift's Law of
Criminal Procedure' 2 ed 1969 at 596 ~ 1979 2 SA 25 (AD) Mthetheleli
1979 2 PH H 166
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h · f ." 12)his employment than to remove ~m rom soc~ety . Had the magistrate
imposed a fine or suspended the whole or a greater portion of the
sentence justice would have been done.
In Manho 13) the accused had stolen one goat worth three pounds. He
was a first offender aged 20 years. The magistrate had sentenced him to
imprisonment for nine months. In his reasons for sentence the magistrate
had emphasized the provisions of the Act that a first offender could
be sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months. The magistrate had further
referred to the circumstances of his district that 50% of the district,
Riversdal, was dependent on stock faroming. The magistrate had further
stated that the accused had no fixed employment and that he was therefore
a danger to stock farmers. The magistrate had added that the accused
fl
was a healthy and strong person and had advanced no reason "waarom hy
belet word om 11 eerlike bestaan te voer nie".
Reviewing the proceedings, De Villiers, A J referred to the judgment
of Mr Justice Wessels in Hemley en n Ander 14 ) and concluded that on
charges of stock theft the usual norm for a first offender in respect
of one goat or one sheep is not higher than four to six months I
imprisonment and that exceptional circumstances may result in the
punislunent being higher or lower than the general norm and that it
is not right that the norm itself should change from district to district.
12 Ashworth 429
13 1960 3 SA 200 (CPD)
14 supra
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The sentence was allowed but it was ordered that five months thereof
be conditionally suspended for three years. With respect, the sentence
allowed by the judge was not a logical conclusion and was not favoured
by the circumstances of the case. I t has been said that an
unreasonably severe sentence cannot be justified by the fact that
it is conditionally suspended, as it may be put into operation if
the conditions of suspension are violated. The age of the acused
entitled the magistrate to deal with him in terms of section 290 or
294 of the Criminal Procedure Act, especially because the accused
was a first offender. The magistrate and the reviewing judge were
influenced by the sentencing policy of the courts to impose sentences
of imprisonment on stock thieves. The existence of this policy is
(J
confirmed by sentences imposed in cases discussed later.
Even in cases where there are no aggravating factors som~ magistrates
will, to carry out their sentencing policy, impose unreasonably severe
sentences. This is apparent from the case of Hemley en n Ander. 1S ) In
this case the two accused, both aged 25 years and first offendem had been
convicted under the 1923 Act of stealing one sheep worth four pounds,
the property of their employer. They were each sentenced to imprisonment
for nine months with compulsory labour. Giving the reasons for sentence
the magistrate had said that "Veediefstal is 'n ernstige oortreding
en dit is n oortreding wat ernstige afmetings in hierdie distrik aangeneem




"Die landdros verwys daarna
dat veediefstal n ernstige
oortreding is. Na my beskouing
is di t nie korrek om di t sonder
meer te stel dat di t as n tipe
misdryf ernstiger as ander
soorte diefstal is nie. Die
diefstal van vyftig pond kontant
van n boer is na my beskouing
in gewone omstandighede n ernstiger
misdryf as die diefstal van
sy gusooi ter waarde van twee
pond. So ook, as die teenstelling
t ussen n halwe karkas van n
hoender en 'n waardevolle goue
polshorlosie is."16)
The judge stated that the usual sentence for that sort of case was
four to six months' imprisonment with compulsory labour and that it
is the circumstances under which the theft of stock or produce is
conunitted which determine whether or not the specific case which comes
before a magistrate's court justifies an unusually heavy sentence.
The sentences of the two accused were altered to those of six months'
imprisonment with compulsory labour. What has been said about keeping
first offenders out of gaol applies in this case. It is unfortunate
that a first offender who had stolen a sheep worth four pounds had
('
to serve six months I imprisonment with compulsory labour. Ashworth
says: "Yet there is no doubt that the val ue of the property obtained
is an important element in assessing the gravity of a property offence". 17)
A more shocking sentence was imposed in the case of Ndhlovu. 18 ) The
accused, a Black male of about 35 years of age had been convicted
of theft of a duck worth Ri, 25, the property of his employer. The
16 at 398
17 At 181. See Hiemstra 629. See Chiloane case infra
18 1961 2 SA 637 (NPD)
accused was a first offender.
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The magistrate had sentenced him to
imprisonment for six months.
had, among others, said:
In his reasons for sentence the magistrate
"I agree with great respect
that the sentence passed in
this case is a robust one.
Ixopo is chiefly a farming
commtmi ty where farmers mainly
farm with stock and poultry.
During 1 960 approximately 89
cases of stock theft were tried
at Ixopo alone apart from the
three periodical courts in
the district." 19)
The magistrate had further stated that thieves had caused poultry
farming int he district to be "a risky and z.mrewarding business" and that
for approximately two
years a sentence of six months
had been the normal sentence
passed on first offenders for
the theft of say one fowl where
no mitigating circumstances
existed". 20)











magistrate refers to the
that no mitigating factors
fotmd to be present in
case and adds that the
that the accused stole
duck from his master would
to be an aggravating factor. "21)
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In the judge's opinion the magistrate had misdirected himself where
he decided that, without more, the fact that an employee had stolen
from his employer was an aggravating factor. The magistrate had not
heard any evidence regarding the conditions of employment of the accused.
The judge said that the sentence appeared to be so severe as to be
unjust and he ordered- that it be altered to one of thre emonths'
imprisonment.
The case of Mabisela22 ) shows serious consequences of over-emphasis of the
seriousness ot tne'offence. A Black male aged 22 years had been convicted
of the theft of two fowls worth one pound and ten shillings. He had no
previous convictions. The magistrate had sentenced him to nine months'
imprisonment.
The reviewing judge, Mr Justice Galgut, referred to some judgments
of his Division in which judges had emphasized that a sentence of
imprisonment for six weeks or two months was adequate punishment for
the theft of one or two fowls by a first offender. The sentence was
set aside and one of three months' imprisonment was substituted therefore
23)In Madlala the accused had been sentenced to undergo 180 days'
imprisonment after a conviction of the theft of 17 sheep. The case
deals with compensatory fines and does not contain the particulars
of the accused. In Chiloana 24) the accused had stolen a rooster
worth 80 cents belonging to a Black woman.
22 1960 4 SA 117 (TPD)
23 1968 1 SA 329 (NPD)
24 1962 4 SA 567 (TPD)
The accused had killed
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the rooster but it had been recovered by the complainant the following
day. The complainant had eaten it. The accused had a previous conviction
for the theft of a plough worth RiO for which he had been fined R30
or in default of payment to undergo 90 days' imprisonment. The magistrate
had sentenced the accused to 180 days' imprisonment. The sentence
appears appropriate.
light.
Theft of 17 sheep should be viewed in serious
In his reasons for sentence the magistrate had stated that he had
taken into account that the only livestock a number of Black owned
was fowls and that theft of fowls was prevalent in the district.
The reviewing judge, Mr Justice Trollip, referred to several cases
including the one of Choaka in which Ramsbottom, J stated:
"The theft of fowls is prevalent
everywhere, and I do not }mow
a time when this type of offence
was not prevalent. Severi ty
of sentence does not prevent
people from stealing fowls.
The temptation to take a fowl
is a strong one and has always
been a strong one I think
that, when the court is dealing
wi th an offence of this kind,
it must have regard to the
fact that although it is difficult
to protect fowls, they are
not very val uable forms of
property."25)
The sentence was reduced to imprisonment for 90 days.
In Tshawana26 ) the accused aged 40 years had been convicted of
25 quoted in Mabisela case (supra )" It was before the Transvaal




counts involving the theft of nine horses worth R666. The accused
had one previous conviction (it is not stated in the report what it
was for) which was ignored for purposes of sentence.
sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment on each count.
He had been
In his reasons
for sentence the magistrate had stated that the following factors
were aggravating: the fact that the horses had ~en stolen in Lesotho
and had been brought into the Republic, the considerable value of
the horses, that stock theft is a serious crime and the the legislature
has authorised heavy penalties in respect thereof. The judge did
not consider the latter view justified because, he said, the Stock
Theft Act, 57 of 1959 does not provide any penalty for the theft of
stock. He further said that it did not create any special offence
of stock theft and that the offence remained theft but it was subject
to various special provisions of the Act. The judge was further of
the opinion that it would seem to be a misdirection to say that the
legislature has provided heavy punishment for stock theft.
The judge was of the opinion that there was a striking disparity between
the sentence imposed by the magistrate and the one he considered
appropriate. The sentence ~s reduced to six ~onths' imprisonment
on each of the six of counts. The magistrate had misinterpreted the
Legislature's policy by holding that the Legislature had authorised
heavy sentences.
Our courts correctly emphasize that in a case where a non-White accused
has stolen stock from his employer it should be asked before sentence
is imposed what wages the employer pays the employee. In Nkubo en
27)n Ander the two accused had been convicted of the theft of one
27 1972 1 SA 266 (OPD)
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sheep, the property of a White farmer. The record does not reflect
the ages of the accused nor does it" show whether or not they had previous
convictions. The magistrate had sentenced the accused to four months'
imprisonment and 18 months' imprisonment (of which nine months were
conditionally suspended), respectively.
-Before the sentences were imposed the first accused had informed the
magistrate that he earned R3 per month and received half a bag of
mealie meal and that he had five children aged 20, 18, 16, 10, and
8 years, respectively. He had asked that a suspended sentence be
imposed. From the magistrate's reasons for sentence it appears that
( .
he had ignored the first accused's statement that he earned R3 per
month and received half a bag of mealie-meal.
Reviwing the proceedings, Mr Justice Smuts referred to the statement
of Diemont, J28) to the effect that in cases of this type the enquiry
referred to earlier should be conducted by the court before sentence
is imposed.
The sentences were set aside and the case was referred back to the
magistrate to act in the light of what has been said.
The Appellate Division29 ) has shown that imprisonment is not the only
sentence which should be imposed on stock thieves.
28 in Jacob en n Ander (supra)
29 in Scheepers 1977 2 SA 154 (A D)
In this case the
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accused, a 42 year old White male had been sentenced by a regional
court to undergo 12 months' imprisonment for the theft of one beast
which belonged to a Black male.
The accused was a first offender and was unmarried. The accused had
unsuccessfully appealed to the Transvaal Provincial Division. In
his reasons for the sentence the magistrate had, among others, advanced
the following reasons: that his district bordered Swaziland and that stock
theft was prevalent, that the accused, a White, had stolen a beast
belonging to a Black, that the sentence which had been imposed on
the accused was normally imposed by that court on Blacks who had committed
the offence and was confirmed on review and that the sentence should
serve not only as punishment but also as a deterrent for possible
offenders.
On behalf of the accused it was argued that at the age of 42 years
he was a first offender who would lose an annual income of R12 000
as a result of imprisonment. It was further argued that the sentence
was shocking. Kotze, A J A concluded that the appeal should be dismissed.
In his judgment, Viljoen, A J A stated that the magistrate had been
influenced by sentences which had been imposed on Blacks who had committed
the offence and had thus misdirected himself. The judge of Appeal
stated further that it is an established principle of our law that,
in regard to punishment there should be individualisation and that
in the process of individualisation sociological circumstances and
other relevant circumstances which surround the individual cannot
be lost sight of. The judge concluded that the sentence imposed by
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the magistrate be set aside and be substituted for by one of a fine
of Ri 000 or in default of payment, to undergo imprisonment for six
months. A further six months' imprisonment was to be conditionally
suspended for three years. It was added that the fine could be paid
in instalments if the appellant approached the magistrate and his
application was granted. Wessels, A J concurred.
To be welcomed in this case is that compulsory imprisonment is not
the only type of punishment in cases of stock theft. In all the cases
discussed earlier compulsory imprisonment was imposed even where there
were strong mitigating circumstances. Magistrates ought to change
their sentencing policy and impose fines in appropriate cases, which
is the Legislature's sentencing policy.
In Khumalo and Others 30 ) the first accused had been convicted of six
counts involving 61 goats. He had been sentenced to three years'
imprisonment of which one year was conditionally suspended for five
years on each count - an effective sentence of 12 years' imprisonment.
The first accused was aged 33 years and had two previous convictions
1· of stock thef t .
goats.
He had played a leading role in the thef t of the
The second accused had no relevant previous convictions. He was 40
years of age and had been convicted of five counts. He had been sentenced
on each of the five counts to two years' imprisonment of which one
year was conditionally suspended. The third accused, aged 29 years
was a first offender.
30 1983 2 SA 650 (NPD)
He had been convicted of five counts and had
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been sentenced on each count to imprisonment for two years of which
one year had been conditionally suspended.
In his reasons for sentence the magistrate had stated: "Die hof moes ook
in ag neem dat hy (nr 1) waarskynlik nie meer as ses jaar van sy vonnis
sal uitdien voor hy op parool uitgelaat word nie." It is obvious that
the magistrate had been influenced ~y the same consideration when
he imposed sentences on the other accused.
On review it was held that the magistrate's approach in connection
with the release on parole of the first accused was wrong and amounted
to a serious misdirection and that the magistrate had not taken into
account the cumulative effect of the sentence on the first accused.
The sentence of the first accused was reduced to one of two years'
imprisonment on each count of which nine months were conditionally
suspended. The sentences imposed on the second and the third accused
were reduced to 15 months' imprisonment on each count of which five
months were conditionally suspended.
The attitude of our courts is that in sentencing stock thieves where
stock is stolen from farmers whose farms border other countries and
the stock, because it has been removed over the border, is not easily
recovered, courts are entitled to consider the interests of such farmers.
31
)
In this case the accused had been convicted by a regional court magistrate
in Rustenburg of the theft of 17 head of cattle worth about R3 000,
the property of a farmer whose farm bordered on Bophuthatswana. The
31 Huma 1983 1 SA 40 (A D)
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cattle had been driven into Bophuthatswana. Thirteen of the cattle
worth R2 200 had been recovered. The accused was 38 years of age
and was a first offender. He had been in regular employme~t before
the commission of the offence.
undergo seven years' imprisonment.
for sentence, stated:
The magistrate had sentenced him to
The magistrate had, in his reasons
"Ek moet oak kyk onder andere
na die belange van d~e boere
op die grens. Dit is van belang
dat hulle beskerm moet word.
Di t so u 'n kwade dag wees indien
die boere op ons grens sou
moet padgee omdat hulle uitgeroei
word op die grense, hulle vee
gesteel word, ensovoorts. "32)
The accused had unsuccessfully appealed to the Transvaal Provincial
Division. He had then appealed to the Appellate Division. While
conceding that the circumstances in which the offence had been committed
were aggravating, Rabie, C J considered these mitigating factors:
the age of the appellant, that he was a first offender and that he
had been in regular employment. The sentence of imprisonment for
seven years was confirmed but it was .ordered that three years thereof
be conditionally suspended for five years.
The magistrate had apparently not given the necessary attention to
the mitigating factors referred to by Rabie, C J . In Mthetheleli 33 ) the
judge was of the opinion that if the circumstances of the case do




imprisonment should not be such that the accused remains in the company
of hardened criminals for a long period. Although the appellant
in the Huma case would remain in prison for a long time the judgment
of the Appellate Division suits the circumstances of the case.
4. STATISTICS
A sample of ten sentences imposed by the Lower Umfolozi (Empangeni)
magistrates' courts was obtained. The sentences were imposed between
1 October 1983 and 30 May 1984 by two magistrates attached to this
court. The sentences are shown in the table that follows. Court
records were the source of information.
Unfortunately mechanically recorded evidence had not been transcribed
in all the cases. It was therefore not possible to establish whether
or not circumstances existed which justified sentences of fines or
suspension of portions of the sentences, especially those of the other
three who had no related previous convictions. From the available
information the sentences cannot be criticised.
TABLE
1 2 3 4 5
TYPE OF STOCK AGE OF ACCUSED SEX. RELATED UNRELATED SENTENCES
PREVIOUS PREVIOUS
CONVICTIONS CONVICTIONS
NUMBER YEARS NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 6-9 12-18 2-3
months' months' tyears'
MALE FEMALE impri= impri= impri=
son= son= sorunent
ment ment
A. CATTLE 4 32 - 37 4 4 NIL 2 1 2 1
B. GOATS 32 23 - 30 2 2 NIL 1 1 NIL NIL NIL
31 - 38 4 4 NIL 3 1 2 2 NIL
EXPLANATION
Six months of the 15 months' imprisonment imposed on a goatthief, with one unrelated previous conviction,
who had stolen 4 goats, were conditionally suspended. The other sentences were not suspended. As regards
goats, at least three goats were stolen in each case. According to records the average value of one beast
was R350 and that of a goat was R25. The accused sentenced to imprisonment for three years had two previous
convictions for stock theft. The sentence had been confirmed on review. Two of the four' accused convicted






Some of the judgments which have been discussed show that the sentencing
policy of the courts was contrary to principles of sentencing and
resulted in disturbingly inappropriate sentences. Although the two
Acts make provision for the imposition of fines on first offenders
magistrates prefer compulsory imprisonment sentences. The cases do
not show that investigations aimed at establishing the financial means
of accused persons were conducted before sentences were imposed.
Emphasis is laid on the policy of the legislature to the detriment
of other factors which ought to be taken into account as mitigating
factors. In most cases there is a striking disparity between sentences
imposed by magistrates and those allowed by reviewing and appeal courts.
It is unfortunate that some proceedings in the magistrates' courts
are not automatically reviewable by superior courts. 34 ) It is possible
that inappropriate sentences imposed by regional courts and magistrates
who have held the substantive rank of magistrate or higher for a
period of seven years, would be interfered with on appeal or review
if they had come before judges. One can only pity those accused persons.
Decisions by judges in most of the cases which have been discussed
are to be welcomed. The following guidelines by judges are useful:
(i) The legislature has given no indication that in cases of
stock theft, mitigating circumstances should not be taken
. 35)lnto account,
34 section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act
35 Moqena case (supra)
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(ii) An attempt must be made to investigate circumstances with
a view to establishing whether or not mitigating factors
. 36)eXlst,
(iii) In a case where the accused is an employee who has been
convicted of the theft of his employer I s stock and the said
accused has consumed the meat, the court should establish
what the wages of the accused are and whether or not such
wages can enable him to obtain meat lawfully elsewhere,37)
(iv) The theft of fowls is prevalent everywhere. Prevalence
of the crime should therefore not be over-emphasised,38)
(v) Severity of sentence doe_s ·not prevent people from stealing
fowls,39)
(vi) A fine, instead of compulsory imprisonment, may be imposed
on a first offender,40)
(vii)
(viii)
The fact that a convicted and sentenced accused person. might
be released on parole should not affect his sentence.
41
)
The Stock Theft Act does not create any special offence
of stock theft nor does it provide any penalty for the theft
of stock. The offence remains theft which is subject to
the various special provisions of the Act. 42 )
36 Jacob en n Ander case (supra)
37 Ibid
38 Chiloane case (supra)
39 Ibid
40 Scheepers case (supra)
41 Khumalo and Others (supra)





From what has been said it is clear that some judges and advocates
h "d d f " 1) A d" t thseriously doubt t e In epen ence 0 our maglstrates. ccor lng 0 e
Hoexter Commission the image of criminal justice in our lower courts
is "impaired by observance for administrative arrangements incompatible
wi th the stand.ard of j trlicial aloofness expeted of magistrates". 2)
Magistrates are public servants appointed subject to the provisions
of the Public Service Act. They are transferred without their consent.
They are dependent on merit assessment for promotion and salary increase.
In merit-assessing a magistrate use is made of reports by the head
of his department, his regional merit committee and the central merit
committee.
A magistrate is liable to a possible departmental inquiry by the
Executive. He is, as a result of the inquiry, liable to a possible
finding of guilty of misconduct.
The Public Service Act 3) defines misconduct as disobeying a "lawful order
given by a person having authority to give it" and commenting in public
1 views of· Eksteen, J Dicott, J Milne, J Sydney Kentridge, S C and
submissions of the Hoexter Commission
2 Fifth and Final Report, Part A 27
3 supra section 17 Cc)
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.. . f d t t" 4)"upon the adm~n~strat~on 0 any epar men . A finding of guilty
of misconduct by the Executive may lead to termination of his services.
These provisions are contrary to justice. On being found guilty
of misconduct, in terms of the Public Service Act, the Commission
for Administration may recommend to the Minister of Justice that
such magistrate's salary or grade or both his salary and grade be
reduced to a recommended extent.
5
)
Judges of the Supreme Court are not appointed subject to the provisions
of the Public Service Act. The above-mentioned anomalies and shortcomings
in the protection of judicial independence of judicial officers do
not apply to them.
A transfer from one office to another may entail serious consequences,
such as parting with acquaintances and experiencing schooling problems
relating to a magistrate's children. Health problems flowing from
change of environment may be experienced. It is obvious that some
magistrates will, as far as possible, avoid transfers. Those will
always attempt not to annoy their master. They will always heed
departmental instructions even when they discharge their judicial
duties. For example, if a magistrate acted contrary to the departmental
instruction which prohibited him from commenting unfavourably on
the evidence of a police officer (referred to in the first chapter of
this work) he could be subjected to an enquiry which could result
4 section 17(f)
5 section 18(2.1)(d) and {e)
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in termination of his services, reduction of his grade or salary
or a transfer to another court. Mr Sydney Kentridge, S C says the
following about the independence of judges:
it would be unthinkable
that any such method would
be used to remove a judge merely
because he gave a judgment
or judgments which ·the Government
did not like. The independence
of the judge is thus a reality
and not a mere legal fiction". 6)
The proposed creation of intermediate courts to be staffed by our
regional magistrates has met with criticism from judges.
7)
The criticism stems from the suspicion that those who best carry out
'policy' as referred in the report will get promotion". 8) Mr Justice
Milne went on to say that if magistrates were to be made 'more like judges
in power and function' it was absolutely necessary to make them more
like judges in training and conditions of service also. Mr Justice
Eksteen9 ) said the magistrates are trained in the civil service to
act as the administrative organ to carry out Government policy through
out the country.
That leading lawyers of the country believe that magistrates are
not independent is further obvious from the cormnent of E Louw in
6 at 651
7 such as Mr Justice Milne at 459
8 Milne at 460
9 at 519
.. ,,10) h"De Rebus Procurator~~s were
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it is said that there used to be
a time when magistrates enjoyed considerable status in the public
service and, as a result, in the eyes of the communities they served.
The editor further said that lIthe Government has allowed their status
to be deval ued. In the public service they do not rank as high as
they used to. Although the magistrate is the senior sometimes
only Government representative in the community he is no longer
adequately cloaked with the trappings of status," because "his function
as judicial officer is deflated by the numerous petty duties with
which he is often overloaded. "
Some of the evidence adduced before the Hoexter Commission
11
) was to the
effect that Commissioners had to exercise judicial powers as well
as the performance qf ~9-ministrative functions and that such authority
enabled a commissioner as a representative of the,:goo:.e:r:nment"om die beleid,
van die Regering uit te voer en om beleidsaspekte soos deur die
Departement bepaal aan Swartes tuis te bring". It was argued that it was
"monstrous and quite untenable for officers of the very department
which lays down the policy wi th regard to Blacks to presi"de at the
trial of a Black for offences directly connected with the implementation
of that policy". The same can be said of magistrates.
Some of the cases discussed in the preceding chapters have shown
the effect of policy considerations on sentences in our magistrate's
10 (1971) 45 DR at 360
11 Fifth and Final Report - Part B 390
"
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courts. In some cases where strong mitigating factors were present
magistrates ignored, such factors but emphasised the Legislature's
sentencing policy or their sentencing policy. The result was that
disturbingly severe sentences were imposed. Although some of those
sentences were interfered with on appeal or review the accused had,
in some cases, suffered injustice.
As stated in the first chapter, courts are obliged to apply the
Legislature I s sentencing policies. However the courts are free to
formulate their own sentencing policies and principles. Some sentences
imposed by magistrates reveal that they experienced difficulty in
interpreting the Legislature I s policies. By imposing unduly severe
sentences they erroneously believed that they were applying the
Legislature I s sentencing policies. Even after the legislative policy
had been interpreted by the Supreme Court some magistrates either
misinterpreted or over-emphasized that policy to the detriment of
other considerations. Statutory minima (if any) and maxima may,
subject to certain cautions, suggest the Legislature I s policy regarding
the seriousness of the crime.
Judges of the Supreme court played a significant role in the
administration of criminal justice by providing guide-lines to magistrates.
The impression has been C:L-eu';:ea in the minds of judges and advocates
that magistrates have to do the bidding of their superiors. This
is evident from the views expressed earlier. As long as magistrates
continue to serve subject to the provisions of the Public Service
Act, their judicial independence will be viewed with serious suspicion.
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Magistrates will be inclined to impose unduly severe sentences to
please their superiors so that their positions and chances of promotion
are not jeopardised.
2. RECOMMENDATIONS
2. 1 General note
What has been said about magistrates does not suggest that nothing
good can be said about their administration of justice.
earlier, some of the sentences discussed are appropriate.
As stated
According
h H C " 12) hto t e oexter ommlSSlon t e average standard of the criminal
justice administered in the district magistrates' courts is satisfactory
and in the regional courts it is very good. Mr Justice Milne had
f'
this to say about the appointment and promotion of magistrates:
"There are some very admirable
men among our regional magistrates,
make no mistake, but between
them and the j l.Xiges differences
exist which it would be mealy-
mouthed to ignore. Moreover,
while no doubt some magistrates
can and do resist it, there
is insidious pressure buil t
into the promotion system to
please those who promote one
to higher status and salary. "13)
Mr Justice Eksteen
l4
) said that he had the greatest respect for our




magistrates and for the way in which they performed their duties.
2.2 Recommendations of the Hoexter Commission
The Commission I s recommendations concerning the Lower Courts included
the following: 15 )
Ca) that the performance of judicial work on one hand and the performance
of administrative work on the other be separated as soon as possible;
Cb) that soon after the separation has been effected all judicial
officers in these courts be made independent of the public service;
Cc) that the appointment, discipline and termination of services
of judicial officers in these courts be governed by the
recommendations of advisory bodies and that members of such bodies
be drawn from the ranks of the said judicial officers themselves;
Cd) that all aspects of the conditions of service of judicial officers
in these courts be protected by statute, that their salaries
and other benefits of office may not be reduced or curtailed
and these be determined from time to time with regard to the
recommendations of the Council of Justice;
(e) that, as part of the process of making judicial officers in these
courts independent of the Public Service, steps be taken to recruit
judicial officers from all groups in the private sector;
Cf) that a national centre for practical legal trainingC"the National Law
School") be established ,to be open to members of all racial groups,
with a view to the proper staffing of the courts and that the
15 Fifth and Final Report, Part A 41
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centre should not fall within the Public Service. The centre
should provide intensive practical courses in criminal and civil
law;
(g) that the administrative functions which are presently perfonned
by magistrates be assigned to "resident magistrates" who shall be
public servants and that resident magistrates be conferred with
limited jurisdiction to postpone criminal cases, fix bail in
unopposed applications in less serious offences, to confinn
admissions of guilt and to hear "petty" criminal cases;
(h) that the criminal jurisdiction of resident magistrates be limited
to:
(i) fines not exceeding the amount pennissible in respect of
admissions of guilt (R100, according to section 57 of the
Criminal Procedure Act),
(ii) imprisonment for a period not exceeding one month but excluding
a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine.
(i) The commission recommended that proceedings in· criminal cases
heard by resident magistrates be reviewed by district magistrates;
f'
(j) that the punitive jurisdiction
fines be increased to R30 000
of the lower courts to impose
in the case of regional courts
and R3 000 in the case of district courts.
If these recommendations are implemented the independence of magistrates
will no longer be doubted and government policy considerations will
not be the main factor before sentences are imposed. If established,
the national centre for practical legal training will serve a very
useful purpose magistrates will receive policy-free training.
The quality of justice in the lower courts will be enhanced. It
..
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is hoped that magistrates who will have been trained in terms of
the present arrangement will be subjected to the envisaged training.
2.3 Recommendations by some lawyers
Mr Justice Milne 16) said that a fundamental alteration in the training,
appointment and conditions of employment of magistrates was needed.
The judge said: "The first necessity is for magistrates to be seen
to be as independent as possible". He suggested that promotion of
magistrates be controlled by a panel on which there is at lest a
number of Supreme Court judges equal to the number of other members
of the panel. The judge went on to say that judges were by reason
of their function as the appeal and the reviewing court in the best
position to judge impartially, apolitically and non-departmentally
how well or otherwise magistrates are performing their functions.
He said that once magistrates were freed from purely departmental
control their independent status would automatically be enhanced:
Mr Justice Dicott said it was arguable whether all civil servants "tend to
60 the bidding of their superiors in a conscious effort to enhance
their prospects of promotion". He said that what could not be argued is
that there "is the instincti ve and firmly rooted bias in favour of
the state inevitably produced by a working life dedicated to the
service of its interests and the implementation of its policies". The
judge recommended that magistrates be freed from administrative duties




Mr Sydney Kentridge also was of the opinion that magistrates be removed
. d" l' d d f h bl' , 18)from the ordlnary lSClP lne an proce ures 0 t e pu lC serVlce.
3. AUTHOR I S VIEWS
The views of these leading lawyers reflect a serious defect in our
judicial system. This is cause for concern. Magistrates try criminal
Offences under the Internalcases involving the policy of the State.
Security Act 19 ) are tried by our regional courts. Awareness that
such offences are considered very serious by the State may cause
a magistrate to impose an unduly severe sentence on a convicted person,
as a lenient one, he might believe, will not please his superiors.
After all his superiors are vested, in terms of the Public Service
Act, with powers
another region.
including the power to recormnend his transfer to
The transfer may be implemented against his wish.
Reports made on him may be unfavourable, thereby prejudicing his
chances of promotion or salary increase.
It is not yet known whether or not the recormnendations which have
been mentioned, will be implemented and when the implementation will
take place. Even after the implementation of the recommendations
the danger will still be there. The already practising magistrates
might still be affected by "the instinctive and firmly rooted bias in
favour of the state", 20) Those. might, in sentencing, over-emphasize
government policy.
18 at 654
19 74 of 1982
20 Didcott at 660
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As resident magistrates will, if the recommendations are implemented,
remain public servants, they will be subject to the conditions presently
complained of. The remedy will lie in the review of their proceedings
by district magistrates who will not be public servants.
Before the recommendations are implemented, as suggested earlier,
seminars attended by magistrates should be held to discuss penalty
clauses of new statutory offences. A judge of the Supreme court
should be invited to lead discussions at such seminars and to give
guide-lines. The seminars should, if possible, be held before new
acts come into operation. Although inappropriate sentences are
interfered with on appeal or review, accused persons suffer irreparable
losses as a result of imprisonment which ought not to have been imposed
by trial courts.
The Department of Justice should refrain from issuing directives
, concerning procedures which magistrates should follow and suggesting
sentences. Such directives interfere with the discretion of magistrates.
Before the recommendations are implemented the Department of Justice
should ensure that magistrates who are appointed to the Bench have
received adequate training in sentencing.
Before the recommendations are implemented it would be a step in the
right direction to give effect to Mr Justice Milne I s suggestion that
promotion of magistrates be controlled by a panel on which there
is at least a number of Supreme Court judges equal to the number
of other· members of the panel. Mr Justice Milne correctly pointed
out that judges are by reason of their function as appeal and reviewing
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court in the best position to judge impartially and non-departmentally
how well or otherwise magistrates are performing their functions.
Once this suggestion was implemented magistrates would be seen
as independent judicial officers. They would not feel that their
chances of promotion would be jeopardised if they did not impose
sentences that pleased their superiors.
be done and would be seen to be done.
21
)
In this way justice would
It is trusted that the recommendation that the punitive jurisdiction
of the lower courts to impose fines be increased, will be implemented
after magistrates have been freed from the Public Service and after
the national centre for legal training will be in operation. Magistrates
are like operators in industries who should be trained in handling
more dangerous yet useful machines, before such machines are introduced
into industries. The proposed punitive jurisdiction will be "more
dangerous" than the existing one. Its "operators" should therefore be
trained to "prevent accidents". An "accident" would include a sentence
which nas been improperly influenced by government policy.
Sincere thanks should be expressed to our lawyers and the Hoexter
Commission who have .shown great concern about the quality of justice
in our lower courts. It is trusted that the Department of Justice
will cause the recommendations to be implemented. It is further
trusted that after the implementation of the recommendations magistrates
will not be seen as organs of the Government whose task is to promote
its policies.
21 See also Dlamini, C R M "Courts in a Democratic State with special
reference to Magistrates' Courts" to be published in (1985) 9
"Bulletin of the Institute for Public Service and Vocational
Training',' 'Jni versi ty of Z ul uland .'
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It is of vital importance that the public should have confidence
in our courts. What has been said clearly shows that some members
('
of the public do not have such confidence in our magistrates. In
22) O'H J 'd·Gubudela and Others agan, sal.
"It is also clear that persons
exercising these judicial functions
must not only be impartial
in fact but they must do and
say nothing which suggests
that they have ~losed their
minds to any question in the
case."
Our magistrates will be seen as independent judicial officers. The
Hoexter Commission suggested that " ... as part of the process of making
jUdicial officers independent of the ·Public Service, active steps
be taken to recruit officers from all racial groups in the private
sector". 23)
Some people believe that a good judicial officer is not necessarily
"a good efficient top public servant. ,,24) Appointing magistrates from
the private sector would build up confidence in the administration of
justice. The public have confidence in our judges because they are
appointed from the private sector. Hence' in his editorial comment
in "De Rebus Procuratoriis" Mr E Louw said: "Our Supreme Court has
unimpeachable reputation for independence from executive-control
- not only because of the terms of the Constitution but also because
such qualities as independence, objectivity and impartiality form
an ingrained part of each judge's nature. ,,25) Mr Louw said that this was
22 19594 SA 93(E) at 95
23 see 2.2(e) of this chapter
24 Mr Justice Milne at 459
25 supra at 359
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in a large measure because they are drawn from amongst those who
have risen to the top in a highly competitive profession. 'He said
that the profession of advocates is one in which objectivity and
independence of thought, knowledge of the law, ability and skill
count. He said that these qualities are not acquired suddenly and
overnight but they are fused into a person's character only through
a lifetime of independent action and thought.
What has been said is sufficient to show that the present conditions
of service of our magistrates are unsatisfactory. It is trusted
that the Department of Justice will urgently consider and implement
Dlamini states that flan independent judiciary is the mark of a maturely
democratic state". 26) As of all civilised legal systems, the foundation---
f 1 1 . h' f' d d . d" 27)o our ega system lS t e eXlstence 0 an In epen ent JU lClary.
the recommendations of the Hoexter Commission.
It is submitted that it has been clearly shown in this work that
government policy considerations influence sentences to the detriment
f' of justice in some magistrates' courts. As long as they remain puolic
servants magistrates will fear to deviate from patterns which will
have been set. Their interpretation of legislative sentencing policies
and their sentencing policies might be influenced by policies of
the executive contained in departmental circulars.
26 see footnote 21 of this chapter
27 Kentridge at 654
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